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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the continuing development of a union's duty to

fairly represent its members, the duty owed by a union to its members based
upon negligence principles and the recent development of the duty to
accommodate in the field of human rights legislation.
As the federal govemment and seven of the ten Canadian provinces

moved to codiw the union duty of fair representation the lower courts saw

a continuing need for judicial supervision in the area of intra-union conflict.
However, the Supreme Court of Canada appears to have willingly accepted
ouster of the courts' inherent jurisdiction in favour of statutory mbunals. 1
critically assess those cases in which the courts concluded their jurisdiction
was ousted.
1 also trace the development of the duty to accommodate union

members in circumstances where the union is guiity of adverse affect
discrimination. 1 criticaily assess those circumstances where the courts have
allowed an extension of the jurisdiction of human rights mbunals based upon
what 1 refer to as administrative tribunal (as opposed to judicial) lawmaking.
The analysis of the courts' willingness to accept ouster of its

jurisdiction in the field of intra-union conflict and its willingness to permit
human rights tribunals to expand their own jurisdiction sets the stage for a

cal1 for less law making by tribunals and a greater willingness by the courts
to recognize that tribunals do not possess any jurisdiction other than that
afforded by the Legislator .

Without the help and assistance of the folIowing persons this thesis
would never have been possible:
Professor Emeritus W .H. Charles
Professors Bruce Archibald and Innis Christie
My spouse and partner Maureen Greer Bell, and our children

Stephanie, Shawn, Rory, Ryan and Patrick
Mrs. Sheila Wile
The staff at the Weldon Law Library, Dalhousie University

My former partner John A. Buchanan, late of Fredericton, New

Brunswick, who passed away July 4, 1994. This thesis is dedicated
to

his memory.

Introduction

The purpuse of this thesis is to criticaliy examine the responsibility of
trade unions toward their members within the context of recent judicial
developments in the fields of a union's duty of fair representation toward its
members as well as its duty to accommodate members. I have purposeiy
avoided any detailed analysis of union unfair labour practices, the duty of
fair representation as codified in various Provinces, and other legislative

provisions that impose administrative requirements upon unions.
In Chapter I, 1 outline the history, largely from American materials,
of this duty of fair representation and place it within the context of other
significant developments in common law jurisdictions .
In Chapter II, 1 Ieave the reader a view of the varying standard of

care flowing from a union's duty of fair representation in both Canada and
the United States.

In Chapter III, 1 attempt to make the case for the imposition of
liability upon a trade union based upon mere negligence. 1 suggest there has
been a misunderstanding in the application of decisions of the Supreme
Court of Canada in matters dealing with empioyer-union conflict. The

2

extrapolation of principles flowing fiom employer-union conflict to conflicts
between the union and the employees (intra-union conflict) served by it, is
not, with respect, a just and fair approach to intra union conflict. I am aided
in this analysis by judgments from New Brunswick, Nova Scotia,

Newfoundland and Saskatchewan.

In Chapter IV,1 consider the development and application of the duty
to accommodate as it relates to trade unions. The recent development of the
duty to accommodate imposed upon unions in the human rights field will no

doubt reduce the opportunities for the courts to M e r develop and refine
the duty of fair representation. While 1 am of the view that individual union
members are disadvantaged by interpretations of the Courts requiring proof
of gross negligence before a union is liable for its irnproper conduct, unions

are thernselves disadvantaged as they attempt to identiv those circumstances
in which they might have a duty to accommodate members while respecting

collective agreements negotiated by them.
In Chapter V, 1use several recent cases to demonstrate why I believe
the courts will be more inclined to limit the law making role with which

certain labour mbunals have clothed themselves. This will foster the
continued judicial development of tort duties owed by unions to their

mernbers.
Chapter VI represents a summary of the current state of the law in

relation to issues surrounding intra-union conflict discussed in this paper.

CHAPTER I
The Development of a Duty of Fair Representation

Black Americans hoping to benefit from the boom of the war years
following the great conflict of 1939 - 1945 soon had their hopes and drearns
shattered. Shattered by the very institutions that had been created to protect
the working men and women of the western world. While union leaders

espoused equality and fraternity for dl, those cries rang hollow to the
millions of black men and women who hoped to share in the wealth of the

post-war years. Black Americans often faced a hostile union leadership that
placed linle value on the principle that dl men and women are created
equally.
When contract language in collective agreements, negotiated by white
union leaders and white employers, forced black men to work at menial
jobs, while supewisory positions were reserved for whites ody, no
complaint was heard from white union leaders. When black men were
systematically replaced by white men on less labour intensive tasks because
of an allegedly valid contract between an employer and the union
democratically elected to represent the workers, no complaint was heard

5

fiom union leaders. Majoratarianism was the standard response used to

justiw intra-union discrimination.l
The rationale for the hands-off approach by the union leaders was
purportedly based upon principles of democracy and integrity. After ail,
was a union not a collectivity designed to protect the interests of a majority
of its members in ways it considered appropriate? Surely, the state had no
interest in the intemal affairs of trade unions! And finally, was a trade

union not unlike a fiaterna1 organization or club, possessing the power to
make its own rules?

The American jurists of the mid-twentieth century were faced with the
daunting task of responding to arguments such as those set out above.
American constitutional law had not yet developed to the point that it alone
could be relied upon to combat the apparent racism of the unions. The
principles of union democracy, majority nile, and the political clout of
American white society found themselves before a Bench that seemed to

have few tools with which to face the daunting challenge of fighting

discrimination against black working men and ~ o m e n . ~

'

See, Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R.

&id.

Co. 323 US. 192 (1944).

6
In spite of the criticism that is ofien levelled at the courts and the

justice system in generd, the development of the law in the field of union
responsibility toward its membership is a credit to the creativity of the
Bench. The courts in the United States of America enIisted some of the
most versatile and useful tools of the Anglo-Amerïcan legai system as they
struggled with the injustices occurring within the union ranks in post-war
America. Tort concepts of neighbourliness , reasonableness , and faimess
were employed in conjunction with the Iegal principles of agency, fiduciary
duty, and contractual responsibility to craft remedies for apparent wrongs.

In the early case of Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R.

Co.3 the

Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Engineermen had acquired
bargaining rights pursuant to the Raiiway Labor ~ c f to' represent d l
firemen. Service as a fireman was a prerequisite to service as an engineer.
While a significant number of firemen were black Arnericans, the majority

were white. That majority had the right to select their bargaining agent. The
majority selected the Brotherhood which permitted only white members. In
spite of the fact blacks could not be members of the Brotherhood, the

Supra, note 1.
48 Stat. 1185; 45 U.S.C. ss 151 et. seq.
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Brotherhood stiil had a responsibility to represent them.
The white controlled Brotherhood wished to ensure biacks were not
promoted to engineer positions. It set out to accomplish this by entering into
agreements that limited the nurnber of black foremen in each senior@
dismct, controlling the seniority rights of blacks and restricting their
employment opportunities.
The petitioner Steele and fellow black employees filed a complaint in

the Supreme Court of Alabama, claiming, among other relief, an injunction
against the enforcernent of the agreements made between the railway
companies and the Brotherhood. The Supreme Court of Alabama took the
position the complaint stated no cause of action because the Railway &or
A n gave to the Brotherhood, the exclusive jurisdiction to represent

employees in a craft. That exclusive jurisdiction could not be interfered with
by the court. The Supreme Court of the United States disagreed. In

rendering the opinion of the court, Chief Justice Stone relied upon principles
of duty emanating fiom the broad powers that had been given to the
Brotherhood. He stated:
"We think that the Railway Labor Act imposes
upon the statutory representative of a craft at least
as exacting a duty to protect equally the interests
of the members of the craft as the Constitution

imposes upon a legislature to give equal protection
to the interests of those for whom it legislates.
Congress has seen fit to clothe the Bargaining
representative with power comparable to those
possessed by a legislature body both to create and
restrict the rights of those whom it represents, . .
. but it has also imposed on the representative a
corresponding duty . . . the duty to exercise fairly
the power conferred upon it in behalf of al1 those
for whom it acts without hostile discrimination
against t h e d
Frankly, the "corresponding duty" to which the Court referred was not
imposed by Congress. It was created by the Courts to respond to the issue
then before it. This corresponding duty constitutes a classic example of

judicial lamaking through application of legal p ~ c i p l e sfounded in tort
and agency. These legal concepts are clearly evident in the following excerpt

"It is a principle of general application that the

exercise of a granted power to act on behalf of
others involves the assurnption toward them of a
duty to exercise that power in their behalf! . . . It
does require the union, in collective bargaining
and in making contracts with the carrier, to
represent non-union or minority union members of
the craft without hostile discrimination, fairly,
impartially and in good faith".6

Supra, note 1 at 202, 203.
Supra, note 1 at 2 M . 204.

9
The union, having taken upon itself the role of agent for its members, had

a duty act in their best interests?

In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howartf a white controlled
union negotiated a contract which resulted in the loss of jobs by black
porters because of their race. Howard was a member of a separate black
union. He and other black men in his union were adversely affected by the
majority union contract. Howard's cornplaint was that the defendant

brotherhood discriminated against the black union. He sought an order
declaring the contract nul1 and void. In rendering judgrnent in favour of
Howard, the U .S. Supreme Court concluded the union must execute its msr

"without lawless invasions of the rights of other workers".9
We see, then, that by 1952 the courts had employed the notion that

trade unions owe a duty toward their members in order to provide a remedy
in circumstances where none seemed availabie. However, other than by way

'

Simiiar approaches are evident in the judgments in Syres, et a i v. Oil Workers
Intedonal
Union, et ai 323 F. 2d. 739 (5 C i . . 1955), 350 U.S. 892 (1955) and
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard 343 W.S . 768 (1952).

Supra, note 7.
Supra, note 7 at 774.

10

of dicta,1° the United States Supreme Court had not, by that tirne, applied
that principle in any cases other than those involving dlegations of racial
discrimination in the context of workers employed in the railway sector
pursuant to the Railway Labour Act.
It was not until the case of Ford Mutor Company v. Hu$7md1 that
the Supreme Court considered a fair representation cornplaint whose ratio
did not involve an allegation of racial discrimination.
In Hz@mn, the Company and the union had agreed to a clause which

gave seniority to renuning military servicemen upon completion of six

month's service with the Ford Motor Company. Huffman complained that
the union had violated its duty to fairly represent al1 employees because it
had discriminated on the basis of pre-employment military service which

was unrelated to job performance. He argued the only conditions upon
which a union could discriminate were those related

to

seniority,

performance, and other job related issues. The U.S. Supreme Court
concluded the seniority credit negotiated for servicemen was within the
bounds of relevancy. The Court acknowledged that the employer and the

See, for example, Wallace Corporation v. National Labour Relations Board 323
U.S. 248 (1944) and Commwzications Association v. Do& 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
'O

"

356 U.S. 330 (1953).
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union could make reasonabie distinctions without violating the duty of fair
representation. Although the Court did not interpret the duty as broadly as
H u f i a n had hoped, (he did not obtain the relief sought) its conclusions did

extend the duty beyond one which limited itself to issues of racial
discrimination.
The Court concluded as follows:
"The complete satisfaction of ail who are
represented is hardly to be expected. A wide
range of reasonableness must be allowed a
statutory bargainhg representative in serving the
unit it represents subject always to complete nood
faith and honestv of purpose in the exercise of its
discretion".l2 (emphasis added)
The corollary of the Supreme Court's opinion was that the exercise
of discretion by a union that was not made in complete good faith and

honesty of purpose was actionable. While lack of good faith and honesty

was actionable, no positive standard that must be met by a union had yet
been defined.
Was this developing duty anything but an intentional tort? The cases
seemed to be sending mixed messages. Consider the Steele case as an
example. In that case, the predominantly white union sought a contract

12

excluding blacks from seMng as firemen. The petitioners sought to enjoin
their union fiom negotiatiag such an agreement. The Court discussed the

exercise of a granted power to act on behaif of others while at the same time
exhorting the union to avoid hostile discrimination. A requiremeiit to
exercise a granted power on behalf of others imposes a higher standard upon

a trade union than the mere avoidance of hostile discrimination.
The standard of care was m e r refined in the two leading American

cases of Huqhrey v. Moore13 and Vaca v. Sipes.I4

In Hwnphrey v. Moore two companies merged. Their employees
were represented by the same bargaining agent. An issue arose as to
whether the seniority lists should be dovetailed or whether each unit should
maintain its own k t . After initially announcing it would take no position

on the issue, the union changed its mind and recornrnended dovetailing to
the joint labour-management cornmittee assigned the task of resolving the
dispute. The plainUff, who was in the unit opposed to dovetailing, sued the
union president alleging the order approving the dovetailing was arbitrary,
capricious, and contrary to both the practice within the industry and the

l3

375 U.S. 335 (1964).

'* 386 U.S. 171 (1967).

collective agreement.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals found there was a breach of the duty
to fairly represent al1 employees because the union sought to represent two

sets of employees with antagonistic positions. The result in the Court of
Appeai was the imposition of smct liability against any union who was
called upon to represent employees with conflicting interests. In considering
the practicalities of union management the U.S. Supreme Court rejected
such a proposition:
"We are not ready to find a breach of the
colIective bargaining agent' s duty of fair
representation in taking a good faith position
contrary to that of some individuals whom it
represents nor in supporting the position of one
group of employees against that of another ...
because] conflict between employees represented
by the same union is a recurring fact. To remove
or gag the union in these cases would surely
weaken the collective bargaining and grievance
process " lS

Unlike the facts in the racial discrimination cases, those in Vaca v.
Sipes did not cry out for court intervention. The employee who made the

allegation that his union had treated him unfairly had returned fiom sick

Zbid. at 349-350.In al1 Canadian provinces and those areas governed by federal
jurisdiction such issues of successorship and inter-mingling of employees are now the
exclusive domain of the labour relations tribunais.
lS
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leave with a medical certificate stating that he was fit to return to work.
The employer questioned the validity of the certificate and had the employee

see the company doctor who concluded the employee should not return to

work which required heavy lifting. The union processed the grievance to
the fourth level and then had the employee examined by an independent
physician at union expense. The independent physician agreed with the
company doctor's opinion that the ernployee was not work-ready. The
union dropped the grievance and suggested the employee accept the
employer's offer of a referral to a rehabilitation centre. The employee
brought action against the union for breach of its duty of fair representation.
He sought an order forcing the union to proceed with the grievance. The
U.S. Supreme Court found in favour of the union. However, in the course
of rendering judgrnent the court formulated the standard of care expected of

a union in order to fulfil its duty of fair representation:

"Under this doctrine, the exclusive agent's
statutory authority to represent al1 members of a
designated unit includes a statutory obligation to
serve the interests of d l members without hostility
or discrimination toward any, to exercise its
discretion with complete good faith and honesty
and to avoid arbitrary conduct. " l6

I6

Note 9 at 358-360.
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While the standard applied in Vaca v. Sipes imposes a higher one than
that of simply avoiding hostility, the formulation of the test, because of its
reference to arbitrary conduct, leaves some question about whether
intentional conduct is required. The reference to "hostility or discrimination"
indicates a clear requirement of some sort of guilv intent. The failure to
act in good faith and with honesty contemplates proof that the union
executive intentionally acted in bad faith and with dishonesty. Finally, from
the cases discussed, infa, we will see the test for arbitrariness ranges from

simple negligence to irrationality . The most commonly applied definition of
arbitrariness is that it lacks a rational basis. Decisions have been held not to
be arbitrary if they are based upon relevant, permissible factors. In any

event, it is clear that discrimination and hostility required intentional conduct
while arbitrary conduct required something more than mere or simple

negligence. l7
The onus upon a union member who considered himself or herself to

have been mistreated by the union executive was heavy. The courts would

For an excellent analysis of the hostility, discrimination and arbitrariness test see,
Neva S . Flaherty, Detennining Standardsfor a Union'sDm of Fair Representdon: The
Case for Ordinary Negligence (1980) 65 Corne11 Law Review 634 and cases cited
therein. See aIso, Adams, Canadiim Lubour Law, 2nd Edition, Canada Law Book Inc:
Aurora, 1998, page 13.1-13.10.
l7
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only intervene in cases of hostility or discrimination, lack of good faith and
honesty or where the union member could prove the union had been
arbitrary in its treament of him.
We will see that since the early cases up to and including the present
t h e the American standard of proof for the arbitrary component of the test
has, with varying interpretations, remained at one of irrationality. In fact,
it could be said the standard a union must meet is lower today given some

recent cases than it was in earlier stages of its development.

The Canadian standard has, however, evolved significantly. It will be
demonstrated that in those Provinces where the duty has not been codified
there exists substantial jurkpmdence that the standard is one of simple
negligence. These issues are more fully dealt with in Chapters II and III,
infra.

Tort Law Context
It is surprising it took so long for the courts to develop a standard
against which to measure the conduct of unions toward their members. Once
a duty was recognized, courts still exhibited considerable restraint in
imposing standards upon unions. Similar restraint was not exhibited in other

17

areas of human endeavour.
It is important to juxtapose the development of the concept of the duty
of fair representation with other major developments in the field of tort and

contract Law.
In 1932, at least 12 years before the U.S. Supreme Court judgments

in Steele and Howard, Lord Atkin wrote his infamous judgment in
Donoghue v. ~tevenson'~
wherein he concluded that persons within our

reasonable contemplation are our neighbours. We owe them a duty to avoid
foreseeable h m . If the law of torts could be employed to provide a remedy
to a consumer of soda in circurnstances where contract principles were of

no avail, couid not this same concept of duty have been employed to found
an action in negligence by a trade unionist toward his executive? Are not
union members at least equally within the contemplation of members of the

union executive as are soda pop drinkers within the contemplation of the
bottler?
Obviously,the principles flowing from Donoghue v . Stevenson did not
lirnit themselves to soda pop drinkers. Before the decision in Vuca v. Sipes,

[1932]A.C. 562; [1932] AU E.R. 1. This test, has, of course been accepted and
is well entrenched in Canadian law given such decisions as C .of Komloops v. N i e h
[1984] 2 S.C.R. 2; and J m v. British Columbia [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1228.
l8
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the courts had concluded that aggrieved parties to a contract were not

lirnited to a contractual remedy,lg and that professionals were liable in
contract as well as negligence.*O There were also claims that attorneys
rnight be found liable in negligence as well as c ~ n t r a c t . ~ ~

Perhaps the best example of the debate concerning the duty to take
care is found in Palsgrafv. Long Island Rail&

Co." a decision rendered

long before Steele and Howard. Justice Cardozo, speaking for the major@
concluded every negligent act must be predicated upon a duty to someone.
Andrews, J. in the dissent would have us separate concepts of duty from
those of liability. He would have concluded that one owes a duty to the
world at large to refrain from those acts that would threaten others.
It is not my intention to repeat that debate. My purpose now is

simply to suggest that union members are in a sufficiently proximate
position to the executive that it should have them (the mernbers) within their
reasonable contemplation when negotiating collective agreements or

I9

Noaon v. Lord AsMurton, [1914]A.C. 932.

20

Chandler V. Crane, Christmas & Co., [M11 2 K.B. 164.

21

See, Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence (1959). 12 Vand. L. Rev.

755.

(1928)162 N.E. 99 (N.Y.C.A.); 248 N.Y. 339 (C.A.).
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proceeding with grievances. However, from the era of Vaca v. Sipes to the
present day, courts and mbunais have struggied with the degree to which a
union owes such a d ~ t yto its mernbers.
Uncertain of the extent to which negligence principles sbuld govem
the relahonship between the union executive and the rnembership, the courts
effectively created an intentional tort that has gradually given way to
concepts of negligence. It is this evolution fkom the intentional tort to the

tort of negligence that will be the focus of the next chapter.

Fiduc*

D.y

Before tracing the evolution of the tort duty in matters of intra union
disputes it is appropnate to comment upon the fiduciary relationship that
exists between a union member and his or her executive. That relationship
was an integral part of the development of the duty of fair representation in
the United States. The relationship of dependence by the member upon his

or her union was immunenta1 in the conclusion that a statutory obligation
existed in Steele and Howard. The grant of power to the union required that
it act in the interests of the member.

It is also important to note that the remedy sought in Steele and

20

Howard was not one of general darnages. The petitioners sought to have the
offending contract language removed. Their demand was for a remedy that
historically would have been available in Courts of equity. A fiduciary
relationship is distinguished frorn a relationship in which ordinary negligence
arises by reason of the presence of loyalty, trust and confidence?
This fiduciary analogy is weil afticuiated in Cha@eurs, Teamstersand

Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry et al.24Terry brought action against his

employer for violation of the collective agreement and joined his union as
a Party, aileging breach of its duty of fair representation contrary to section
301 of the Laoour Management Relations ACL" The issue before the

Supreme Court of the United States was whether the plaintiff was entitled
to a jury trial. If the action was strictly equitable then no jury need be

summoned. If the action was legal, or part legal and part equitable then the
plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial. The union, not wanting a jury trial,

argued the relationship between it and its member was comparable to a trust.

While the Court concluded an action for breach of the duty of fair
Lloyd's Bank Lrd. v. Bundy, [1975] Q.B. 326; cited with approval in Norberg v.
U5mib, [i992] 2 S.C.R. 226.
24

494 U.S. 558 (1990).

25 61 Stat. 156; 29 U.S.C. s.185 (1982 ed.). A union may only be liable to its
member if the plaintiff is able to prove a violation of the collective agreement.

representation was part equitable and part legal the following excerpt
demonstrates the role trust considerations have played and continue to play
in the development of that duty:
"Just as a tmstee must act in the best interest of
the beneficiaries, 2 A W. Fratcher, Scott on Trusts
f 170 (4th id. l987), a union, as the exclusive
representative of the workers, must exercise its
power to act on behaif of the employees in good
faith, Vnca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.at 177. Moreover,

just as a beneficiary does not directly control the
actions of a tnistee, 3 Fratcher, supra, f 187,
individual employee lacks direct control over a
union's actions taken on his behalf, see Cox, the
Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining
Agreements, 57 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 21 (1958).
The trust analogy extends to a union's handling of
g-rievances. In most cases, a tnistee has the
exclusive authoriv to sue third parties who injure
the beneficiaries' interest in the trust . . . The
tnistee then has the sole responsibility for
determinhg whether to settle, arbitrate or
otherwise dispose of the claim. Similarly, the
union typically has broad discretion in its decision
whether and how to pursue an employee's
grievance . . . .26

That fairly recent statement of the American jurisprudence is consistent with
the earlier statements of the law. In Steele the development of the duty of
fair representation was grounded on the basis that a union has a granted

Supra, note 24 at 567, 568.

power to act on behalf of others and this power involves the assumption that
that power will be exercised in the interest and benefit of the union member.

In Howard the Court referred to the trust relationship existing between the
union and its members. In Buzartez v. United Transportation uniod7 the
duty of fair representation was described as a fiduciary one.2s In I.B.E. W.,

Local 801 v. N . L . R . B . ~the
~ duty of a union toward its members was

described as a special obligation.
In Canada we have seen significant developments in the field of
fiduciary responsibility in recent years. While those developments are useful

for purposes of understanding the origins of the duty of fair representation,
Canadian courts have not yet had the occasion to fully integrate them into
the jurisprudence relating to the duty of fair representation.
In Canadian jurisprudence a fiduciary relationship is said to exist

where :
(a)

one party agrees to act on behalf of or in the best interests of,
another person;
-

"

429

F. 2d. 868, 871 (3d Cu. 1970).

See also, ntompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Cor Porters 3 16 F . 2d. 2 10 (4th
Cir. 1963).
L8

29

307 F. 2d 679 (D.C.Cir. 1962).
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(b)

that party is in a position to affect the interests of another
person in a legal and practical way; and

(c)

that party (fiduciary) is able to use the discretion given to hirn
or her to the detriment of the benefi~iary.~~

Based upon the test set out above, a union member is without doubt
the beneficiary of a fiduciary reiationship with the union executive who has

charge over the grievance process and the negotiation of benefits on his or
her behalf.
The union, upon obtaining voluntary recognition or certification
becomes the exclusive bargaining agent for the employee vis-a-vis the
employment relationship. The union mernber thereby loses al1 rights to
negotiate tems of his or her employment contract. In deaiing with
employers, the union effectively becomes the agent for the union member.
Recent judgments fiom the Canadian courts in matters unrelated to

trade union affairs assist in an assessment of how the courts will deal with
this relationship between tort and fiduciary obligation that flows from the

employee-union relationship.
In Bluebers, River IIldian Band v. Canada (Minister of lndian Affairs

30

See, Frame v.

Smith (1987), 42 D.L.R. (4th) 81 at 88, 89 (S.C.C.).
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and Norrhern Development) l the Indian Beaver Band had surrendered

mineral rights to the Crown in trust "to lease" for its beneflt, In 1945 the
Band surrendered the reserve to the Crown to "se11 or lease" . The federal

Crown eventually sold the lands to the Department of Veteran's Affairs,
who in tum sold it to returning veterans. Oil and gas were discovered on the
lands Ui 1976. The Band then brought action against the federal govemment
claiming damages by reason of the improvident sale in 1945 and transfer of
mineral rights in 1940. The daim was dismissed at the trial division and in
the Federal Court of Appeal. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada,
the majority acknowledged by taking on a trustee position in relation to the

mineral rights in 1940 the Crown had a duty to deal with the land in the best
interests of the Band mernbers. While the Court concluded the trust in
surrendered Indian lands couid not be equated with a cornmon law trust, it
did conclude that trust like obligations and p ~ c i p l e swere relevant.32
We have already seen a reference to special obligation33to describe
the fiduciary nature of a union toward its members. Similar words were

31

(1993) 151 N.R. 241 (Fed. C.A.); overtumed on [1995] 4 S.C.R. 344.

32

ibid at 358 (S.C.R.).

"

Supra, note 29.

employed by Justice McLachlin in Laura Norberg v. Morris wnrib, et

a case where a patient s u d her physician in tort (assault) and for
breach of fiduciary duty. McLachlin, J. concluded that the physician patient
relationship "falls into that special category of relationships which the law
calls fiduciary."35
It is this special obligation or special relationship that is the

underpinning of a finding of a fiduciary du@. It arises in any circumstance
where one person or entity assumes the power that would normaily reside
with the other per~on.'~
Perhaps the most significant aspect of a finding that a fiduciary duty

has been breached as opposed to a tort duty is in the approach to damages.
We are familiar with the requirement that damages must be foreseeable. No

such requirement exists where the breach is of a fiduciary duty. This
distinction was aptly stated by McLachlin, J. in Carnon Enterprises Ltd. v.

"

[1992] 2 S.C.R. 226.

Ibid at page 289. In her judgment,McLachlin J.also cited with approvai the earlier
judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada in F m e v. Smith, supra and G w r h v. The
Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335.
35

36 See, Canadian Aero Service v. O'Malley, [1974] S .C.R. 592; Lac Minerals Ltd.
v. Internat~~onal
&rom, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574; Guen'n v. The Queen, 119841 2 S.C.R.
834; W(B) v. Mellor, [1989] B.C.J. No. 1393 (S.C.); Canson Enteprises v. Boughton
& Co., [1991] 3 S.C.R. 534.

Boughton & Co.
"In negligence we wish to protect reasonable
freedom of action of the defendant, and the
reasonableness of his or her action rnay be judged
by what consequences can be foreseen. In the case
of breach of fiduciary duty , as in deceit, we do not
have to look to the consequences to judge the
reasonableness of the actions. A breach of
fiduciary duty is wrong in itself regardes of
whether a loss can be f~reseen."~'

The discussion of tort duty, infra rnust be considered with the
knowledge that a special relationship exists between a union and its members
and that special relationship requires it act as it would prudently act in

relation to its own affairs. Depending upon the facts of the case and the
degree of negligence a mal judge considers appropriate, a fiduciary test
might well be the most advantageous for an aggrieved union member to

advance.
The current state of the law was appropria te!^ summed up by
McLachlin, J. in M(V) v. M(H) and Women 's Legai Educution and Action

". . . a breach of fiduciary

duty cannot be

automaticaiîy overlooked in favour of concurrent

37

Supra, note 36 at 553.

38

(1992), 14 C.C.L.T.1 (S.C.C.).

common law claims . . . for those duties, now that
cornmon Iaw and equity are mingled the courts
have available the full range of remedies, including
damages or compensation and restitutionary
remedies . . . 39
't

Two excellent examples of the courts using equitable remedies to right
wrongs in alleged cases of unfair representation are to be found in Pamch
v. Nova Scotia Nurses' Uniona and Donovan v. City of Saint

In

Panrch the union refused to proceed with the grievance. In Donovan the

union and employer settled a grievance that favoured another employee to
the detriment of Donovan. The trial divisions in both Nova Scotia and New

Brunswick determined the employees would be without a remedy but for

court intervention. In Paruch the union was ordered to proceed with the
grievance. In Donovan the Court, relying upon the Municipaliries A C F ~
struck d o m the setuement of a grievance that had been negotiated by City

Council and the union in circumstances clearly prejudicial and
discriminatory toward the applicant.
Any application of the tort standard discussed infia should always be

39

Ibid at 40.

" (1991), 112 N.S.R.(2d) 101 (N.S.S.C.)(T.D.).
41

(1996), 136 D.L.R. (4th) 110 (N.B.Q.B.)(T.D.).

R.S.N.B. 1973,c. M-22as amendeci.

measured against the backdrop of fiduciary responsibility. The extent to
which intention to deceive or to be dishonest is necessary in proof of breach

of fiduciary duty is debatable given the approach of the Supreme Court in
Blueberry River Indian Band. In that case there was no intention to deceive

or to be dishonest (a low standard to meet). There was however, a failure
to act in the best interests of the Band (a high standard to meet, even higher

than a negligence standard).
Given the approach in Blueberry River Indian Band the court may be

retreating fiom the admonition articulated in Girardet v. Crease & C d 3
where Southin J. stated:
"the adjective 'fiduciary' rneans of or pertaining to
a trustee or trusteeship. That a lawyer can commit
a breach of the special duty of a tnistee, eg. by
stealing his client's money, by entering into a
contract with the client without full disclosure, by
sending a client a bill claiming disbursements
never made and so forth are clear. But to Say that
simple carelessness in giving advice is such a
breach is a perversion of words ... 1 make this
point because an allegation of breach of fiduciary
duty cames with it the stench of dishonesty - if not
of deceit then of constructive fkaud."
Regardless, in matters involvhg intra-union conflict, the prudent practitioner
-

(1987), 11 B.C.L.R.(2d) 361 at 362; cited with approval in Lac Minerals Ltd.
v. I n t e m a h b ~ lCorona Resources (1989),61 D.L.R. (4th) 14 at 28 (S.C.C.); see also,
Hodgkimon v. Sim (1994), 117 D.L.R. (4th) 161 (S.C.C.).
43
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will frame the clah based upon contract, tort and fiduciary p ~ c i p l e s .
Although the expression of these principles will no doubt be
compartmentalized for purposes of pleading, it is important to note that

overlays of d l three are present as courts define the duty of fair
representation and develop the standard by which it is measured.

CHAPTER II
Defining the Duty and Developing the Standard

17re Canadian Standard

Canadian law with respect to the duty of fair representation has been
influenced in two very significant ways. FirstIy, the American development
of the duty was transplanted onto Canadian soil. Secondly, most Canadian
jurisdictions, including the federal goveniment, quickiy codified the duty
thereby limiting its evolution and tefinement by the courts. Courts in the
Maritime Provinces of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward
Island are therefore responsible for most of the latest judicial developments
in the duty of fair representation as there has been no attempt at codification

in those jurisdictions.
The British Columbia case of Fisher v. Pembenone> is singularly

responsible for transplanting American jurisprudence in relation to the duty
of fair representation to Canadia. soil. In considering the duty owed to
Fisher by his union executive, MacDonald, J. concluded as follows:
"That duty (duty of fair representation) is not
spelled out in any Canadian decisions of which 1
(1969),8 D.L.R. (3d) 521 (B.C.S.C.).
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am aware, but there are decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States which are in point.
They define the duty with which 1 am concemeci in
a way which, with respect, appeals to me as sound
and 1 therefore apply them in this case."45
The facts in Fisher v. Pelttberton constitute a classic example of one

made union fighting with another for the hearts and minds of the members
of the bargaining unit - a take-over bid by a rival union.

Mr. Fisher

happened to be on the losing side. In fact, he had been the president of the
iocal union displaced by that supported by Pemberton. When it came t h e
for the union to file a grievance on behaif of Mr. Fisher it was clear he had
little support fiom the incumbent union. In fact, there was clearly animosity
on the part of the union toward Mr. Fisher and a willingness to see him

disrnissed. Considering this history of hostiiity and the perfunctory rnanner
in which the union chose not to proceed with Mr. Fisher's grievance, the

court concluded he had been dealt with arbitrarily. Rather than order the
union to proceed with arbitration, the Court considered the merits of the
grievance and awarded only nominal damages having concluded that the case
was without ment.
Aithough MacDonald, J. accepted the notion of a union duty to fairly

represent its members and stated he iound the Amencan cases appealing to
him, he does not attempt to define the standard in his own terms, nor does
he describe why he finds the American cases appeahg. In fact, afier

concluding the duty of fair representation exists in Canada, and, afeer citing
the relevant American jurisprudence his Lordship concluded the decision to
abandon the grievance was not made in a "non-arbitrary" manner. The
Court did not attempt to define arbitrary.
The blanket acceptance of the early American jurisprudence has
experienced legislative and judicial modifications in the past number of
years. Every province except New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince
Edward Island has codified the duty or some aspect of it in their relevant

labour relations s t a t ~ t e . ~Furthemore, the govemment of Canada has
iocluded the duty in the Canadcz Labour Codem4'
The Supreme Court of Canada has attempted to defîne the duty in

-

--

" Labour Relations Code S.A. 1988 c . L-1.2 as amendeci, S.

151
Labour Relations Code S.B. C . 1992 c. 82 as amended, S. 12
The Lubour Relarions Act R.S.M.1987 c. L-IO, S. 20
Labour Relations Act 1995 S.S. 1995, S. 74
Labour Code, R.S.Q. 1977 c. C-27as amended, S. 47.2
Labour Relations Act R 5 N . B 1990 c. L-1, S. 130
The Trade Union Act R.S.S. 1978 c- T-17 as amended, S. 25.1
These statutory provisions are fully set out in Schedule A, appended hereto.

"

R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2. See, Schedule A.

33

Canadian terms in Canadian Merchant Service Guild v. Gagnon," Supply
and Services Union of the Public Service Alliance of Cana& and Gendron
and the Public Service Alliance of (Ânada, Local 500.57," and Centre

Hospitalier Regina Ltee. v. P r u d ' h ~ m m e . ~ ~

In Gagnon, the grïevor had been hired by the employer as a pilot boat
captain. He was transferred to the position of maintenance worker. He
considered the transfer to be a dismissal. A grievance was filed and taken
through the first three levels of the grievance process. However, the union

refused to take the grievance to arbitration.

Eight months afier being

transferred to the position of maintenance worker, the grievor was
dismissed.
He did not seek to grieve his dismissal from the position of

maintenance worker. However, several months after his termination, he
brought an action in the Quebec Superior Court alleging wrongfil dismissal
by the employer and breach of the duty of fair representation by the union,

both alleged violations of obligations owed pursuant to article 1056 of the
Quebec Civil Code. In both the Quebec Superior Court and the Quebec
[1984] 1 S.C.R.509; (1984). 9 D.L.R.(4th) 641 (S.C.C.).
49

(1990), 109 N.R. 321 (S.C.C.); [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1298.
(1990), 69 D.L.R.(4th) 609 (S.C.C.); [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1330.
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Court of Appeal," the Courts concluded the union had breached its duty

of fair representation.

In the Quebec Court of Appeal, L'Heureux-Dubé, J. (as she then was)
concluded that Gagnon's transfer was actuaily a disguised dismissal. She
aiso concluded that considering Gagnon's insistence that the maner be taken

to arbitration and aii the facts given to the union by him, the union had
failed to carry out a sufficiently indepth investigation. L'Heureux-Dubé, J.

concluded the union's conduct was "arbitrary and wrongful"" in that it was
taken negligently without thorough investigation. This is the first statement

from a Corn of Appeal that "negligent conduct" could rneet the test of
arbitrariness. Interestingly, she also concluded that "negligence and
incornpetence" constituted "bad faith".53
Those conclusions in the Quebec Court of Appeal would have made

unions liable for negligent conduct, a significant step in the development of
the law when compared to the relatively low standard emanating fiorn Fisher

v. Pembenon. The Supreme Court of Canada rejected that approach. It

51

Canadian Merchant * c e

[1989] 1 S.C.R. 509.
5Z

Note 51 at 529 (S.C.R.).

53

Note 51 at 530 (S.C.R.).

Guldetalv. Gagnon, [1981] C.A. 431; overturned,
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concluded that failure to undertake a substantive or thorough investigation
could not constitute bad faith. It fomuiated the common Iaw duty of fair
representation in the following manner:
"The following principles, concemhg a union's duty of fair
representation in respect of a grievance, emerge from the caselaw and academic opinion consulted:
the exclusive power conferred on a union to
act as a spokesman for the employees in a
bargainhg unit entails a corresponding obligation
on the union to fairly represent al1 employees
comprised in the unit;
1.

when, as is hue here and is generally the
case, the right to take a grievance to arbitration is
resewed to the union, the employee does not have
an absolute right to arbitration and the union
enjoys considerable discretion;
2.

this discretion must be exercised in good
3.
faith, objectively and honestly, after a thorough
smdy of the grievance and the case, taking into
account the significance of the grievance and of its
consequences for the employee of one hand and
the legitimate interests of the union on the other;
the union's decision must not be arbitrary,
capricious, discriminatory or wrongful;

4.

the representation by the union must be fair,
genuine and not merely apparent, undertaken with
integrity and cornpetence, without senous or major
negligence, and without hostility towards the
5.

36

employee. ""
It is apparent that the tests of arbitrariness, discrimination and hostility
of the early Amencan jurisprudence have suMved and been aansposed into

the Canadian version of the duty of fair representation. In those cases

where the Canadian courts conclude there is intentional conduct of the part
of the union executive, virtually any fact situation can result in an award of

darnages should the union be found to be blameworthy. More problematic,
however, is measuring the degree of serious or major negligence required
to found liability.

It is significant though that Gagnon introduced negligence as part of
the test for determining whether or not the union has met its duty, provided
however, that that negligence is "serious or major".

(i)

Effect of Codijication on the Cornmon Law: Ouster of the
Courts

In Gagnon, this definition of the duty of fair representation constituted

judicial lawmaking consistent with our common law traditions5 given that
Y

Note 51 at 527 (S.C.R.).

A review of the article by H.Patrick Glenn, The & m n h w in
(1995)
74 C.B.R. 261 demonstrates just how clearly the development of the duty of fair
representation is a common law development. The author suggests that the common Iaw
is a method of legal thought built upon the foudation of a free people asking the nght
55

duty had not yet been codified in the Canada Labour Code, the

the

applicable legislation governing the plaintiff s ~ o r k p l a c e . ~ ~
In Gendron, the Supreme Court of Canada considered the codification
of the duty of fair representation as defuied by the Canada Laoour Code.

The plaintiff, an employee of the Goverment of Canada mint, was the
successfùl applicant for a vacancy. The three unsuccessful candidates
grieved. The union conducted an investigation and concluded the employer
had not applied its own standards established for assessing the candidates.

Once those standards were applied, the plaintiff (grievor) was removed from
the position. He then grieved the failure by the employer to award him the
position.
The union supported the Mevance at the first two stages of the

grievance procedure but refised to submit it to arbitration. The plaintiff
(Gendron) then brought action against his union in the Manitoba Court of

questions in an environment of diverse legal traditions. If enough of us ask the right
questions then we just might solve the problem. That is precisely the method by which
the concept of a union's duty to its members has developed and continues to develop.
Perhaps the common law is best defmed as a system of law that refuses to be static. One
whose definition is totally encompasseci by its evolutionary character.
Statutorily based duties are a common feature of modem negligence law and
considered part of our common law development. Numerous examples of statute based
duties are to be found in Linden, C a d i a n Tort Law Butterworths, 6th Edition, Toronto:
1987.
56
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Queen's Bench.

He alleged the union breached the duty of fair

representation owed to him.
The issue in the case was whether the plaintiff could even bring an

action before the courts given that the duty of fair representation was
codified by operation of the Cana& Labour Code. Did that codification oust
the jurisdiction of the Court or did it place it exclusively in the hands of the

Canada Labour Relations Board? In responding to that question, L7Heureux-

Dubé, J., now writing for the Supreme Court of Canada, found it necessary
to:
(a)

examine the duty at common law; and

(b)

examine the Code in order to determine whether it contemplates
any role for the ordinary courts in relation to union conduct (or

misconduct).
L'Heureux-Dubé, J. considered the Canadian and American cases in
some detail as she established the foundation for the common law duty of
fair representation. At page 1315 (S. C .R.) she concludes:
"It is clear then that Canadian Courts have
followed the lead of their counterparts in the
United States in inferring fiom the statutory g r a m
of exclusive bargainhg authority a correspondhg
duty of fair representation."

39

Before proceeding to the second phase of her analysis, that is, whether
or not the codification ousted the common law, L'Heureux-Dubé, J. did not
make any serious effort to define this common law duty, nor did she attempt

to compare the duty at common law to the codification. One would have
expected such an analysis essential before pronouncing upon the issue of
jurisdiction. Obviously, if the duties were different, one from the other,
would the argument that the common law courts were ousted not be
weakened? Similarly, a conclusion at the first stage that the tests were
identicai would no doubt strengthen the argument that the court's role had
been ousted. In fact, at page 13 16 Justice L'Heureux-Dubé concluded the

jurisdiction of the Courts is ousted even before she concluded that the
content of

S.

136.1 (now

S.

37) of the C

QLaoour
~ Code is identical to

the "duty at comrnon law.
Justice L'Heureux-Dubé then arrives at another questionable
conclusion. She concludes the common Iaw duty is not in any sense additive
(to the codification) but merely duplicative.

With respect, I fail to

understand how the common law duv could be duplicative given her
extensive analysis demonstra~ghow that duty had developed from the

Note 49 at 1316 (S.C.R.).
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American cases and how it had developed in Canada quite in advance of any
codification. By her own anaiysis, the codification was duplicative of the
common 1aw and not the reverse.
It is Justice L'Heureux-Dubé's analysis that the common law is
duplicative of the codification and not the reverse that appears to be the
basis for her conclusion that the common law duty is ousted by the Gad
Labour Code. Had she concluded that the Code duplicates or at least

attempts to duplicate the common law duty, she may well have required

greater proof of Parliament's intention to oust the common law jurisdiction
of the Courts.
With respect, it is submitted the Court abandoned its jurisdiction in
Gendron without clear evidence of Parliamentary intention. Although the

Court concluded the comrnon law duty and the statutory duty of fair

representation are the same, it is submitted there are sufficient differences
in procedure and remedies, that, had those differences been fully examined
the Court may not have concluded its jurisdiction had been ousted. Consider
the following:
(a)

at common law, a c l a h for solicitor-client costs can be made;
no such right exists pursuant to the Code;

at common law, a claim for aggravated or exemplary damages
can be made; such a clairn is not available pursuant to the
Code;

at common law, the grounds of appeal or review are broader

than is the case with codification under the Code, where a very
restrictive privative clause exists;"
finally, even in her own analysis, L'Heureux-Dubé concluded:
"Recent amenciments to the Canada
Labour Code rnay restrict the
statutory duty ... thereby arguably
leaving some room for the comrnon
law duty to operate at the collective
bargaining stage.
Given that the common law duty embraced both contract negotiation and
contract administration by the time Gendron was decided, it seems quite
contradictory to acknowledge a possible difference and yet conclude that the
comrnon law duty is identical to the codification. Either they are the same,
or they are not. In this case, even by the Courts own admission, the duties
are not "obviously identical" as previously stated by ber? It is the

Note 47,

S.

122.

s9

Note 49 at 1320 (S.C.R.).

*

Note 49 at 1316 (S.C.R.).
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conclusion that the codification is identical to the common law that has
caused serious error in the development of the Iaw as it relates to whether
or not the courts' jurisdiction is ousted. Unlike the United States al1

Provinces do not assess the issue of whether the courts are ousted based
upon the federal la^.^'
With respect, the erroneous analysis in Gendron does not end with
claims that the statutory duty and the common law duty are identical and the
conclusion that damages constitute the only available remedy in the courts.
With equal zeal, her Ladyship accepts the decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Sr. Anne Nackawic Pulp di Paper Co. v. Canadian Papeworkers'
Union62as one of the determining factors in her analysis that the common

law jurisdiction is ousted by the codification. Although addressed in more
detail later in this paper, the decision in St. Anne Nackawic that the Courts
had no jurisdiction to deal with a dispute between the employer and the

union was premised almost exclusively on the fact that the Legislature had

ousted the jurisdiction of the Courts in very clear language in section 55 of

61

N a t i o ~Labour
l
Relations A n 49 Stat. 449, as amended; 29 U.S.C. S.151 et seq.
(1982ed & Supp. m); and L&our Mamgement Relations Act, I947 61 Stat. 156; s.301
29 U.S.C.S. 185(a).
"

[1986]1 S.C.R.704.
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the New Brunswick Industriai Relations ACT." All disputes between the
parties (employer/union) were to be resolved by Final and binding
arbitration. Such clear words directing unions and its members to settle
their differences (intra-union conflict) by some mechanism outside of the
Courts (apparently ousting the jurïsdiction of the courts) are not to be found

in the Canada L,ubour Code. Regardless, the direction from the Supreme

Court is that the statutory duty of fair representation in Gendron is identical
to the cornmon law duty describecl in Gagnon?
Finally, in considering those cases interpreting the duty of fair

representation that have been considered by the Supreme Court of Canada,
L'Heureux-Dubé, J., in Centre Hospitalier Regina Ltee v . P d 'homme,
supra, describes a two stage procedure to be applied for purposes of

determinhg whether a union has met its duty in this regard:
"First, the union must carefully consider the merits
of the grievance to decide whether it should be
taken to arbitration ... at the second stage, if the
union decides that the grievance has merit, it must
represent the employee without serious negligence,
discrimination or bad faith at al1 subsequent stages
of the grievance procedure.
R.S.N.B. 1973. C. 1-4, as amendeci.
60

"

Note 49 at 340-341 (D.L.R.).
Note 50 at 622 (D.L.R.).
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What constitutes serious or major negligence for purposes of meeting
the standards irnposed by ths duty? Unfortunately, alrhough the Supreme

Court has had several occasions to define serious or major negligence in
tems of a union's duty toward its members, there has been virtually no
guidance from that Court in this regard except on a case-by-case basis.
No doubt, the degree of negligence most akin to "serious or major"

negligence is that of gross negligence. As will be seen, infra,the distinction
between it and ordinary negligence has been considered on numerous
occasions by the Supreme Court of Canada.

(ü)

Gross or Serious Negligence

Perhaps one of the best indicia of what is not considered major or
serious negligence is found in the decision of the Canada Labour Relations
Board in Brenda Haley and Canadian Airline Employees' Association and
Eastern Provincial Aimays (1963) LNnited.66 The Board was called upon

to interpret section 136.1 of the Canada M o u r Code, the same section
considered by the Suprerne Court in Gendron.
In that case, the employee, Brenda Haley, was dismissed for excessive

66

[1980] 3 C.L.R.B.R. 501; (1980) 81 C.L.L.C. 16070.
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absenteeism. She had been active in the union and, until a short period of
tirne prior to her dismissal, appeared to have been a good employee. After

receiving her dismissal notice she sought the advice of her union and filed
a grievance. Not having received a response to the grievance within the
time period set out in the collective agreement, the matter was referred to

arbitration.

At the arbitration hearing the employer objected to the

arbitrability of the grievance because of a missed time limit on the part of
the union. There was no lack of good faith on the part of the union. There

was no arbitrary conduct, nor was there any hostile discrimination. The
missed thne lirnit was, according to the majority, the result of improperly
counting the days within which action had to be taken, an innocent error.
The grievance would not proceed. This was clearly a case where substantid

damage had k e n caused to the grievor by reason of mere negligence.
The Board acknowledged that 'serious negligence' or 'gross
negligence' on the part of the union would constitute a failure on its part to
meet the requirements of the duty of f ~ representation.
r

It also

acknowledged that this pafticular grievance represented the most serious
kind one could file.

It affected the critical job interest of continued

employment of the grievor. In spite of the fact that a mitical job interest was

at stake, and in spite of the fact the union miscounted, the majority
concluded there was no breach of the duty and the grievor was without a
remedy.

Even in his dissent in Haley, board member Jamieson, was unwilling

to conclude that a union could be liable for breach of the duty of fair
representation based upon or-

or simple negligence. In his attempt to

fit the facts of Haley into the established jurisprudence of the Board, which

required prouf of more than mere negligence before a union could be liable,
he concluded:

"...

once a decision is taken to proceed to
arbitration, it can be assumed that a trade union is
fully aware of the gravi@ of the situation. it must
be expected to act accordingly and be accountable
in its duty to represent fairly. It is a gross
understatement to characterize a missed tirne limit
at this crucial stage as an 'innocent mistake'. A
missed time limit during the processing of a
grievance involving for example, a dispute over
two hours overtime wages could be called simple
negligence and should not be viewed in the same
light as a rnissed time limit in a discharge
grievance. The gravity of the issue must raise the
quality of representation expected by an
employee. "67

Supra. note 66 at page 511 (C.L.R.B.R.). The American courts have not been
quite so kind with respect to misseci limitation dates, see for example, R ~ c v.hGeneral
Motors Corporation 523 F . 2d. 306 (6th CK . 1975) Dutrisac v. Chterpillar Tractor Co.
749 F.2d. 1270 (9th Cir. 1982) and Vencl. v. InternahioMI Union of ûperating Engineers

.

The Haley case is but one example of the difficulty labour boards and
the courts have in determining what is serious or major negligence and what

is not. Given that the courts who have considered the duty of fair

representation have not attempted to define serious or gross negligence and
have provided M e by way of analysis that would pennit one to assess
whether a union's conduct is or is not grossly negligent, it is necessary to

consider other examples in tort where gross negligence is or has been the
standard. A consideration of those cases will give some benchmarks by
which to assess whether or not a union has met the standard required of it.

Gross negligence has been considered by Our courts in numerous
circumstances, including, but not limited to, those situations where the
v i c b of an automobile accident was a gratuitous pa~senger,~~
the person

responsible for the safekeeping of goods was a gratuitous bai~ee,~'and
where an injured plaintiff could not recover against a municipal government
137 F. 3d. 420 (6th Cir. 1998) where unions were held liable for missing limitation dates.
The courts considered such conduct to be 'arbitrary' within the definition of d a i r
representation.

"

See, for example, McCulloch v. Murray,[1942] S .C.
R. 141; Thompson v. Fraser,
[1955] S.C.R. 419; Studer v. Cooger, [1951] S.C.R.450; Burke v. Peny and Perry,
119631 S.C.R.379; Waiker v. Cornes, [1968]S.C.R.599; Jackron v. Milhr, [1976] 1
S.C.R.225; Gouiais v. Resoule m e , [1975] 1 S.C.R.365.
COggs v. Bernard (l703), 2 Ld. Raym. 909; (1702). 92 E.R. 107; Fairley &
Stevens (1966) Ltd. v. Goldrwonhy (1973), 34 D.L.R. (3d) 554 (NSSC) (T.D.)1;
Campbell v. Pickard ( M l ) , 30 D.L.R.(2d) 152 (Man. C.A.).
69

48

unless the municipal authority was gurlty of gross negligence.'O

In addition, contracts have k e n drafied so as to preclude liability
unless the offending party is guilty of gross negligen~e.~'
In McCulloch v. Murrayn Sir Lyman Duff, C.J.C., as he then was,

defined gross negligence in the following terms:
" Al1 these phrases, gross negligence, wilful

rnisconduct, wanton misconduct, irnply conduct in
which, if there is not conscious wrongdoing, there
is a very marked departure fkom the standards by
which responsible and competent people in charge
of motor cars habitually govern themselves. "73
In Studer v. Cowper74Kerwin, J. defined gross negligence as very

great negligence. The court in Sruder v. Cowper reaffirmed that the issue of
whether any given circumstance constitues gross negligence is a question
to be decided by the trier of facts.
The deference c o r n of appeal should demonstrate toward trial judges'
conclusions in this regard was well stated by the Court in Burke v. Perry

'O
See, for example, Hollnnd v. City of Toronto, 11927 S.C.R. 242; Harper v.
Prescott, [194û]S.C.R.688.

''

Ca&

v. Canada Steamhip Lines Ltd., [1950] S.C.R.532.

Supra, note 68.
73

Bid at 145 in McCulloch v. Mumay.

74

Supra, note 68.
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and Perry .75 Ritchie, J. (as he then was) held that the characterization of

a set of facts as gross negligence:

". . . involves a reconstruction of the
circumstances of the accident itself including the
reactions of persons involved and îhis is a function
for which the mal iudge who has seen and heard
the witnesses is far better equip~edthan are the
judges of an a~pellatecourt.76
The admonition by Ritchie, J. in Burke v. Perry and Perry that the
mal judge is best suited to make a determination of whether the facts of a

particular case constitue gross negligence appear not to have been heeded
by him in the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Goulais v. Restoule

Estare? In that case, Godais was the only survivor of a tragic accident in

which Mrs. Restoule had apparently crossed the centre line of the roadway
and collided with oncoming trafic.
In Goulais, both the trial judge and the Ontario Court of Appeal

concluded Mrs. Restoule was not guilty of gross negligence. Part of the
evidence at mal included a statement from the plaintiff taken approximately

75

Supra, note 68.

''

&id, at 33 1-332. The Supreme Court of Canada has consistentiy applied this nile.
See, for example, Stein v. The Ship Kmhy K, [1976]2 S.C.R. 802; R. v. Von der Peet,
[1996]2 S.C.R.507: Dickuson v. Universi9 of A l o e ~ a ,[1992] 2 S.C.R. 1103.
77 LI9751 1 S.C.R.365. Here the Court applied the test set out in McCulloch v.
Murray,supra, at note 68.

two months p s t accident in which he said, inter dia,

"It appeared to me as if this vehicle was coming
towards our side of the road . . . I feel strongly
Marilyn (Mrs. Restoule) is not to blame for this
accident. "78

In concluding the respondent was grossly negligent Ritchie, J.
speaking for the majority concluded the facts disclosed in the evidence

required some explanation, which was not forthcoming. He opined as

follows:
"In the present case there is no suggestion of
conscious wrongdoing on the part of Mrs.
Restoule, but with the greatest respect for the
judgments at trial and in the Court of Appeal, it is
my view that a driver who allows her car to
"slowly swewe" into the middle of the left hand
aaffic lane in the face of the approaching lights of
another car is guilty of a "very marked departure
from the standards by which responsible and
competent people in charge of motor cars
habitually govem themselves",and having reached
this conclusion, 1 am satisfied that the
circumstances disclosed by the evidence in this
case were such as to require an explanation
consistent with lack of gross negligence. (See
Walker v. C m e s ).79 No satisfactory explanation
is suggested by the appellant who was the only
survivor of the accident. 1 appreciate that this
Ibid at page 371-372. Dickson, J. in dissent, would not have disturbed the
findings of the lower courts.
79 In Walker v. Cimes, 119681 S. C.R. 599 the court concluded the principle of res
ipsa luquitor couid be used to conclude conduct was grossly negligent.

conclusion m s contrary to the findings of both
courts below. . . w 80
Res ipsa luquitor came in aid of an injured plaintiff to prove gross

negligence.

In the bailment cases of Campbell v. Picar&' and Fairley & Stevens
(1966)Ltd. v. ~ o l d s w o n h both
y ~ ~the Manitoba Court of Appeal and Nova
Scotia Supreme Court, Triai Division, respectively, adopted the test of gross

negligence as set out in McCulloch v. Murray, namely, the marked
departure test.

In Harper v. Town of ~rescon8~
the plaintiff had been injured while
walking on a slippery sidewalk that was maintained by the municipal
corporation. The municipality of hescott was protected by the provisions
of the Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1937, c. 266

S.

480(3)" which provided as

follows:

Note 77 at 369.

''

Supra, note 69.

LI940 S .C.R.688; cited with approval in Sememk v. Hamilton LI9951 O .J. no.
2271 (O.C.J.)(G.D.).

Now, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.45,S. 284, as amended.

"Except in the case of gross negligence a
corporation shall not be liable for a personal injury
caused by snow or ice upon a sidewaik."
Haver v. Prescon, and HolZunù v. Cily of Torontog5were both cases

arising out of slip and fa11 accidents involving pedesmans where the standard
was one of gross negligence. In Hurper v. Prescon the Supreme Court of
Canada refbsed to assess the facts against a standard of recklessness or
flagrant conduct. However, in Holland v. Cily of Toronto the Court applied
a standard of reckless indifference. Those would appear to be confIicting
statements of the law.
Perhaps one of the most colourful definitions of gross negligence is
that adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada v. Canada
S t e m h i p Limired.g6

The case involved a clairn by Canada Steamship Lines against the
Govenunent of Canada. Canada Steamship Lines was the lessee of a part of
the port at Montreal, Quebec and the Govemment of Canada was the lessor.
Clause 7 of the lease agreement provided as follows:
"That the Lessee shall not have any claim or
demand against the Lessor for detriment, damage

[1927] S.C.R. 242; (1927)59 Ont. L.R. 628 (S.C.C.).
86

Supra, note 32.

or injury of any nature to the said land, the said
shed, the said platform, and the said canopy, or to
any motor or other vehicles, materials, supplies,
goods, articles, effects, or things at any time
brought, placed, made, or being upon the said
land, the said platform or in the said shed. "
Employees of the Govemment of Canada caused a fire whiie carrying
out repairs to the leased property. Canada Steamship Lines sought to recover
its damages.
Under Quebec law the clause excluding liability could not operate to
avoid damages caused by gross negligence. It did operate to exempt liability
for mere or ordinary negligence by the goverment of Canada, its servants
or agents."
On the facts of the case, Angers, J. of the Exchequer Coud8
concluded the workmen were guilty of gross negligence or "faute lourde".
Canada Steamship Lines could therefore recover against the defendant
(Canada).
In the Supreme Court of Canada, Rinfiet, C.J.C. noted:
"It was comrnon ground that the gross negligence
referred to in the judgment appealed from is the
equivalent of what is called 'faute lourde' in the

"

The GZengoil Steamhip Co. ez al v. Pilkington et al (1897), 28 S.C.R. 146.

a [1948] Ex.C.R. 635.

French Civil Code, and it was not disputai either
that the lease must be interpreted and applied
according to the law of the Province of
Quebec. "13'
Rinfret, C .J-C. held that the question of whether 'faute lourde' exists
is more than a question of fact because the decision maker must first

properly define 'faute lourde'. To arrive at a proper definition contemplates
a question of law. The proper definition is to be found in the works of

Pothier.go His Lordship concluded:
"On that point, it does not seem to me that one c m
be on safer grounds that to adopt the definition of
Pothier. This Iearned author, who might tnily be
looked upon as being in most respects the basis of
the Civil Code of Quebec, says that the 'faute
lourde consiste à ne pas apporter aux affaires
d'autrui le soin que les personnes les moins
soigneuses et les plus stupides ne manquent pas
d'apporter à leurs affaires. "''
That standard of gross negligence imposes a very low threshold upon
would be tortfeasors. No liability would attach unless the plaintiff could
establish that the defendant's conduct was more indifferent than the most

*

Supra. note 32 at 536.

Robert Joseph Pothier, Osuvres de Pothier, M. Sifiein, Paris: 1821.
9'

Supra, note 32 at 537.
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careless and most stupid people wouid exercise towards their own
interests.92
One cm conclude the analysis of the various judgments touching on
the issue of gross negligence by making the following observations:

while the appropriate definition of gross negligence is a
question of law, whether a set of circumstances constitutes
gross negligence is a decision of fact to be decided by the trial
judge;

evidence of intentional or wilful conduct will not be necessary
to establish gross negligence;
the principle of res ipsa loquitor may be relied upon to establish
gross negligence;
what constitutes gross negligence will vary depending upon the
facts of the case; however, at a very minimum it would seem

prospective plaintiffs must prove very great negligence or a
marked departure from the nom;
when the Supreme Court of Canada refers to "serious or gross
negligence" it is unclear whether the Court is speaking of
equivalent standards or two different ones. The word 'serious'
would seem to suggest a standard somewhere between mere
negligence and gross negligence.
Against this background the following suggestions may be of some
assistance to jurists who are called upon to consider whether a particular set

of circumstances constitutes serious or gross negligence:

Supra, note 32 at 548.
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How critical is the job interest?

As addressed by board

member Jamieson in Haley, does the grievance concem two
hours of pay or the friture employability of the grievor?
How critical is the grievance to the bargaining unit as a whole?
1s it a policy grievance that might affect only two hours of pay
today but potentiaily fi@

hours next month?

Was the union's error the result of neglect or was there a bona

fide effort on the part of the union to ensure the member was

well served?
Was the union's error, however well-intentioned, the result of
a failure to seek outside counsel or engage adequate resources?

Was the union's error one of omission or commission?
1s the grievance process controlled exclusively by the union or

is there an opportunity for individual action by the aggrieved

employee?
Does the matter concern employee rights flowing from
grievance arbitration or contract negotiation. No doubt greater

latitude will be afforded a union in matters of contract
negotiation.

Tite Arne-

S&ndard

The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that mere

negligence is not sufficient to found liability against a union for breach of
its duty of fair representation pursuant to the NdonaI

Labour Relations

Act.93

In United Steel Workers of Arnerica, AEL-CJO-CZC v. ~ a w s o the
n~~
union had, as part of the safety cornmittee duties referred to in the collective
agreement, agreed to assist in mine inspections. When Rawson was killed
in a mine fie, his estate sued in the Idaho Supreme Court.
The issue was whether or not an action in simple negligence was pre-

empted by operation of the federal National Labour Relations Act and S. 301
of the Labour Management Relations Acr, 1947.95
Although a c l a h for unfair representation could be brought in state
or federal court, the federai law had to govem since the inspections were

contemplated in the collective agreement. In relying upon its decision in
Ford Motor Company v. Hu@zm

the US. Supreme Court concluded as

follows :
93

49 Stat. 449, as amended; 29 U.S.C.

495 U.S. 362 (1990).
95

61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. S. 185 (a).

S.

151 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. III).

"The courts have in general assumed that mere
negligence even in the enforcement of a coilective
bargaining agreement would not state a claim for
breach of the duty of fair representation, and we
endorse that view today.

. . . a wide range of reasonableness must be
allowed a statutory bargaining representative in
serving the unit it represents. "%
The Court concluded the federal law did preempt the action in the

state court founded on mere or simple negligence. The union's conduct
would be measured against a lower standard.

The U.S. Supreme Court enunciated an even lower standard in Air
Line Pilots Association v.

In that case O'Neill and his fellow

petitioners were opposed to the eventual settlement reached between their

union, the Air Line Pilots Association and Continental Air Lines following
a lengthy strike. Claiming the union had breached its duty toward them they
sought to have the contract declared invalid. The United States Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit would have found the settiement to have been
arbitrary. It assessed arbitrariness based upon the following factors:
1.

whether the decision was based upon relevant, permissible
union factors;

%

Supra. note 94 at 372.

"

499 U.S. 65 (1991).
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2.

whether the decision was rational considering those factors; and

3.

whether there was a fair and impartial consideration of ail
employees' interests.

The U.S.Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeal's analysis of

the arbitrariness test holding that it would permit more judicial review of the
substance of negotiation agreements than consistent with national labour
policy .98
The appropriate standard was succinctly set out by Stevens, J. for the
full court:

"We further hold that a union's actions are
arbitrary only if, in light of the factual and legal
landscape at the tirne of the union's actions, the
union's behaviour is so far outside a "wide range
of reasonableness" , Ford Motor Co. v. Hu$jhun,
345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953), as to be irrationalVg9
(emphasis added)

This test of irrationality applies to contract administration (grievances) as
well as contract negotiation. lm
That wide range of reasonableness has been interpreted differently by
the various circuits of the United States Appeals Courts.
98

Ibid at 77.

Supra, note 97 page 72.
Irn

Supra, note 97 at 77.

(i)

Zrratrœonality:Extreme Recklessness to Intentional Cmduct

The Seventh Circuit in the United States held that intentionai
misconduct must be shown on the part of the union in order to establish a
breach of the duty of fair representation. In Hoffnian v. Lonza lnc.'O1 the
court held that an action based upon the union's duty to fairly represent its
members might be more "properly labelled as an action for the union
intentionally causing h m to an employee.. .

11

102

In Graf v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern ~ a i l w a y ~the
* ~Seventh Circuit
reinforced the notion that intentional conduct on the part of the union is
required in order to make the case for a plaintiff. The Court did opine that
extreme recklessness might be sufficient to establish a breach of the duty but
it would be so close to an intentional wrong that the treatment of the law
would be the same. At page 112 of Graf the standard was described as

follows:
"The union has a duty to represent every worker
in the bargaining unit fairly but it breaches that
duty only if it deliberately and unjustifiably refuses
to represent the worker. Negligence, everi gross
negligence is not enough; and, obviously,
'O'

658 F. 2d. 519 (7th Cir. 1981).

'O2

Ibid. at 522.

lm

697 F. 2d. 771 (7th Cir. 1983).

intentional misconduct may not be inferred fkom
negligence, whether simple or gross. Although
extreme recldessness is so close to intentional
wrongdoing that the law treats it as the same thing,
we need not wony about that refhernent in this
case. .."
Those who hold to the notion intentional misconduct is required to
establish the claim, argue that to hold otherwise might encourage collusion
between the union and employee. An employee whose chances of success
at grievance arbitration are not good might encourage his union to make a
mistake in pursuing the grievance, thereby providing hirn the opportunity to
bring suit against the employer under Section 301 of the Labour

Management Relations Act, 1947 seeking reinstatement. With respec!,

this

concem is easily remedied by ensuring that the reinstatement remedy not be
available to the Court. With respect to cornplaints arising out of the
grievaace process, the remedies could no doubt be limited to an award of
costs and the referral of the matter to arbitration.

Another justification for limiting relief to situations where the union
has acted intentionally is that unions are to a large extent volunteer
organizatiom whose stewards lack the ski11 and training that is necessary to
hold them to a professional malpractice standard. Frankly, there is very
little cornparison between intentional misconduct and the standard imposed
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upon professionals. It would seem one could at least reach the g r a s
negligence standard without irnposing a professional standard of care upon
union executives.

AIso, given the contractual relationship that exists

between a member and his or her union, it is reasonable to expect the
member wouid be entitled to the best possible representation.

(ii)

Zrrationality: Tire Negligence Standards

Another refinement of the Vaca v. Sipes standard requires a union to
rationally explain impugned conduct. This view holds that if a union cannot
rationaily explain its actions, it will be in violation of its duty to fairly
represent. Bu: for the gross negligence component of the Canadian standard
of care, the test adopted by the Fifth Circuit of the United States Federal
Court in Tedford v. Peaboày Coal Co.'O4 bears smking resemblance to

that adopted by Madame Justice L'Heureux-Dubé in Centre Hospitalier
Regina Ltee., supra. At page 957 in Tedford the Court held:

"We think a decision to be non-arbitrary must be
(1) based upon relevant, permissible union factors
which exclude the possibility of it being based
upon motivations such as personal animosity or
political favouritism; (2) a rational result of the
consideration of those factors; and (3) inclusive of
-

'"

-

- -

533 F. 2d. 952 (5th Cir. 1976).

a fair and impartial consideration of the interests of
al1 employees."
The distinction between the intentional misconduct standard and that
requiring a rational explanation of union conduct appears to be a matter of
proof. For those who hold to the former, the plaintiff must prove intent on
the part of the executive. That c m be a very heavy onus. The rational
explanation standard would appear to assist plaintiffs in that "intent", if
necessary, is presumed.

The union must then provide some rational

explanation of its conduct. Much like the application of principles of res ipsa
loquitor that were applied in Goulais v. Restoule Ertate, the rational

explanation test would, in most cases, require the defendant to produce some
evidence in order to defeat a clairn.
In Harris v. Schwerman Trucking Co.'OS the employee complained
about the union's representation of him following his discharge as a result
of a customer cornplaint. The union presented the employee's grievance,
challenged the employer's assessrnent of the facts and permitted the
employee to be personally present at a joint arbitration cornmittee. The
commiaee upheld the discharge. The employee felt there was no lawfûl
justification for his discharge and brought action in court against his union
IM

668 F. 2d. 1204 (11th Cir. 1982).

and the employer. At page 1207 the court concluded:

"Nothing less than a demonstration that the union
acted with reckless disregard for the employee's
rights or was grossly deficient in its conduct will
suffice to establish such a claim."

In Wyatt v. Interstate & Ocean Transport

~ 0 . the
l ~ facts

do not

appear to constitute p s s negligence. The plaintiff was discharged by his
employer one month after he settled a civil law suit for personal injuries he
had suffered while at work. The company took the position he was

discharged because he could no longer perform the duties required of his
position as a result of the injuries suffered by him. The employee's own
doctor concluded he was 25% disabled. In assessing the merits of the
grievance the union officiais only considered the medical report of the
employee's doctor.
assessment.

They neglected to request the company doctor's

That assessment found the employee suffering from no

disabilities.
Given that the ernployee had just cornpleted a civil action against his
employer, an astute lawyer would no doubt have concluded that the
company's medical report might be more favourable to the employee as a
tactic to limit any damage award against the company. Similarly, an astute
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counsei may well have concluded that the medicd report from the
employee's own doctor might portray the injuries in the worst possible light
in order to ensure adequate compensation. Unfortunately, the union

representative failed to examine the company medical report and concluded
there was no merit to the grievance.
The Fourth Circuit concluded that "grossly deficient conduct" on the

part of the union could constitute arbiîrary conduct necessary to support a
fïnding that the union had not respected its duty to fairly represent the

employee. In watt the court concluded that failure to request the company
medical report was grossly deficient conduct. With respect, while the
failure to request the company report might constitute negligence 1 would
suggest there is a substantial subjective assessrnent by the court in equating
such a failure with gross negligence. Negligent perhaps, arbitrary or grossly
negligent? I doubt it.

This case, where the statement of the standard is very similar to the
Canadian definition of gross negligence is an excellent example of

interpretation of the facts designed to ensure a remedy regardless of the
label one employs to describe the standard. With respect, this approach is
evident in the vast majority, if not all of the cases discussed, supra.
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Based upon the decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court, it would
appear that the simple negligence standard does not constitute any part of the
duty of fair representation in American jurispmdence. However, a Iimited

role for the rnere negligence standard has been accepted in a least two
American jurisdictions .

In Dutrisuc v . Cuterpillar Tractor Co.'" the facts were very similar
to those in Brenda Haley, supra. The union had inadvertently failed to file

a grievance on cime. The arbitrator dismissed the grievance as being
untimely. The employee sued the union for breach of duty owed to him.
The Ninth Circuitlogreached the opposite conclusion fiom the Canadian

Labour Relations Board in Haley. In upholding the employee's clairn, the
Court made a distinction between ministerial acts and discretionary acts
undertaken by the union. Simple negligence would not be sufficient to
found a cornplaint in circumstances where the union considers the pros and
cons of certain action and then exercises its discretion in making its
decision. However, where the individual interest at stake is high and the

'O7

749 F. 2d. 1270 (9th Cir. 1982).

A sixniiar resuit was reached in Vend v. I n t e ~ o n a iUnion of Operming
Engineers 137 F . 3d. 420 (6th Cir. 1998) and Ruzicka v. Geneml Motors Corpororion 523
F.2d. 306 (6th Cir. 1975). It seems American courts are quite willing to define
"arbitrary" as negligent when critical job interests are at stake.
'O8
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union's failure to complete a ministerial act completely extinguishes the
ernployee's claim, simple or mere negligence is the standard that will be
applied.lo9 This has been accomplished, however, by categorizing
negligence in those circumstances as arbitrary conduct.

In the following chapter we will see that in those Canadian Provinces
where the duty of fair representation has not been codified (the Maritime
Provinces), the weight of judicial opinion is that trade unions will be held
liable for harm resulting from acts of simple negligence. This has been
accomplished boldly, in a direct and forthright manner, with the policy
issues well articulated by the various courts.

See. Vend, supra. note 108 at 426 where the court concluded "absentjustification
or excuse, a union's nepligent failure to take a basic and required step, unrelated to the
nature of the grievance, is a clear example of arbitrary conduct. "
'09

Union Liability For Simple Negligence in Canada

In those provinces where the union duty of fair representation has
been codified, the weight of authority holds there is no room for action
against a union arising out of ordinary or simple negligence.lIO This
seems to be the inevitable conclusion given the relatively clear statements

from the Supreme Court of Canada in Gagnon, Gendron, and Centre
Hospitalier. As a result of codification, courts in those jurisdictions were

provided with little, if any, oppoftuirity to consider the relationship between
unions and their members. This naturally resulted in a halting of the

evolution and refinement of the duty of fair representation that one would
otherwise expect from those courts. However, an analysis of the history of
the duty before codification, an examination of the jurisdictiond issues

decided by the courts, and pronouncements of lower courts across Canada
leave room for argument that in at least the three common law Provinces

See, Moldowan v. Saskatchewan Govenvnent Employees Union (1993). 108
D.L.R. (4th) 132 (Sask. Q.B.); overtunied (1995). 126 D.L.R. (4th)289 (Sask. C.A.);
leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada denied [1995] S. C C .A. No. 461 ; and
Mulherin v. United Steelworkers of America Local 7884 (1985), B.C.L.R.347 (S.C.);
overturned (1987)37 D.L.R.(4th) 333; leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada
denied [1987]1 S.C.R. xi; 57 N.R. 156.
"O

69

where the duty has not been codified (New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and
Prince Edward Island), a union may be liable for mere negligence. Also,

in Newfoundiand, where at least part of the duty has been codified, there is
strong judicial pronouncement in support of the position that a plaintiff has
a claim based upon simple negligence where a critical job interest is at

In Copormion de Batteries Cegelect'12, Briere, J. suggested that
simple negligence could constitute serious negligence as contemplated by
paragraph 38(b) of the Quebec Lobour Code113,the English version of
which reads as follows:
"A certified association shail not act in bad faith or
in an arbitrary or discriminatory marner or show

serious negligence in respect of employees
comprised in a bargainhg unit represented by it,
whether or not they are members.
"

Briere, J. in anticipation of facts similar to those in Haley, where
simple negligence denied an employee her right to grieve dismissal,
concluded as follows at page 335:

See, Bzitt v. United Steelworkers ' of Amerka, et al (1993).106 Nfld. & PELR 181

(Nfld.S.C.)(T.D.);
(1994)118 Nfld.& PEIR 303 (Nfld.S.C.)(T.D.).
lL2

[1978]T.T.328.

Il3

R.S.Q. 1977 c. C-27;now section 47.2.

"In my understanding, the legislator here has not
wanted, despite the ambiguity of the text which
seems, in effect, to require proof of serious
negligence, to Iimit this recourse to the point
where an employee will be, for example, definitely
deprived of his right to arbitration of his grievance
if he is able to establish oniv simple negligence by
his union ... 1 do not hesitate to Say that a slight
error (for example, a simple act of forgetting)
which brings about the loss of recourse to
arbitration capable of saving an employee's
employment, truly constitutes serious negligence. "

The case for liability in ordinary negligence was accepted by the triai
division of the British Columbia Superior Court in Stoyles v. United
Steelworkers Local 7619'l4 and Mulherin v . United Steelworkers Local

7884.''' In both Stoyles and Mulherin the superior court concluded that
an action lies against a trade union brought by a union member in simple
negligence. In reaching their conclusions both the Court of Appeal in
Stoyles and the superior court in MuZherin held that section 7 of the British

Columbia Maur codelL6,being the codification of the union duty of fair
representation, did not oust the jurisdiction of the court to consider a daim
of negligence against a union by a member.
Il4

In order

to reach that

(1984), 55 B.C.L.R. 107 (C.A.); Ieave to appeal to the S.C.C. refuseci 57

156.
Il5

Supra, note 110.

Il6

R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 212.
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conclusion, it was essential to find that ordinary or mere negligence did not
form part of the codification of the duty of fair representation.
Interestingly, the lawyer for the union in Mulherin argued that mere
negligence was caught by the codification set out in section 7.

This

approach was necessary in order to make the argument that the Labour Code

was a complete code and there was no jurisdiction left with the courts in
relation to the duty. This argument was rejected by the trial judge in
Muïherin who stated as follows in concluding he did have jurisdiction:

"It goes without saying of course, that the
legislature could have included any desired level of
negligence in section 7(1) but it did not do so and
1 do not think 1 shouid read that concept into the
section. It follows that an allestation of common
law neglirrence in a case such as this may be tried
in this court and there will be an order
accordinelv. " (emphasis added)
The British Columbia Court of Appeal overtumed the mal decision
in Mulherin on the basis that the codification ousted the jurisdiction of the

courts. It overtumed its earlier decision in Stoyles since that decision predated Gendron. It concluded the oniy duty imposed upon a union is to act
without hostility or discrimination, avoid arbitrary conduct and to exercise
its discretion in good faith. Following Gendron, it concluded there is no

common law duty outside the duty adopted in Fisher v. Pemberton which

was now codified.
In spite of the decisions in Cagnon and Gendron, courts in New
Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland appear willing to impose

liability upon a trade union for mere negligence in relation to the
representation of its members.

In Knighr et al v. Canadm Brotherhood of Railway. Transport and
General Workers et al1'' several ernployees who were rnembers of the
defendant union brought action in the trial division of the Court of Queen's
Bench for damages, fraud, deceit and misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary

duty and breach of the duty of fair representation.
The legislative framework goveming the parties was the Canada

Labour Code.lL8 At the relevant rime, section 136.1 of the Canada
Labour Code setting out the duty of fair representation had been enacted.
Also, the trial and appeal courts had the benefit of the decisions in Fisher

v. Pemberton, Gagnon,Mulherin, and St. Anne Nackawic Pulp & Paper Co.
Ltd. v. Canadan Papeworkers Union. Local 219.
The defendant union brought a motion before Russell, J. of the Court

"'(1988).
'18

95 N.B.R. (2d) 342 (C.A.).

R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1,as amendeci.

of Queen's Bench seeking to strike out the claim. It aUeged the Canada
Labour Code ousted the common law junsdiction of the Court of Queen's
Bench. The trial judge concluded the claims did not arise out of rights
created by the collective agreement; the corn was therefore clothed with
jurisdiction.
In the Court of Appeal, Russell, J.3 judgment was upheld to the

extent that claims alleging fraud, deceit, misrepresentatim and breach of
fiduciary duty could proceed before the trial division of the Court of
Queen's Bench. The Court of AppeaI did, however, allow the appeal to the
extent that it concluded the courts had no jurisdiction to address the claim
for breach of the statutory duty of fair representation. In Knight no claim
had been made alleging simple negligence. The decision is, however,
significant in that the Court approved other common law claims against a
union in spite of the codification of the duty of fair representation.
The liability of a union for the tortious actions of its agents was aIso
the subject of the court action in David Duke v. The Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers.l lg The plaintiff brought action against his union

alleging it was negligent in its representation of him in relation to an

(1989), 98 N.B.R. (2d) 99 (Q.B.D.)(T.D.).

arbitration hearing held to consider the question of his dismissal by the
Canadian National Railway Company. As in Knight, the provisions of the

C

d Laaour Code applied, cornplete with the codification set out in

section 37 (previousiy 136.1).
At mai, Creaghan, J. carefully analyzed the decision of the Supreme
Court in Gagnon and concluded that a daim in simple negligence against a
trade union by a union member for matters arising out of the collective
agreement is actionable in New Brunswick. This even where the duty has
been codified by the Canada Labour Code. 1 can do no better than to quote
extensively from Judge Creaghan's decision in explaining why a trade union
operating in today's environment should be liable for the negligent
representation of one of its members. His Lordship opined as follows:
"The law is clear bat a duty of fair representation exists at
common law. The standard of care Uiherent in the duty of fair
representation has been definitively set out by the Supreme
Court of Canada in Canadian Merchant Service Guild v.
Gagnon et al, [1984] 1 S.C.R.509; 53 N.R. 100; 9 D.L.R.
(4th) 64 1. This standard is stated by Chouinard, J. at page 654
D .L.R. of Gamon and is well summarized in the headnote as
reported in that case as follows:
'A union has a duty of fair representation arising
out of its exclusive power to act as bargainhg
agent for al1 employees in a bargaining unit.
Where a union has the right to decide whether to
take a grievance to arbitration, the union's

discretion m u t be exercised in good faith,
objectively and honestly, after a thorough study of
the grievance and the case, taking into account the
significance of the grievance and of the
consequences for the employee and the legitimate
interest of the union. The union's decision must
not be arbitrary, capricious, without serious or
major negligence and without hostility towards the
employee. '
The legislature, subsequent to the tirne the cause of action arose
in Gagnon but prior to the decision by the Supreme Court of
Canada, established fair representation as a statutory duty in
section 136.1 of the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C.1970, c.L1... The present section 37 (fomerly section 136.1) of the
Canada Labour Code sets out the statutory duty in the following
terms :

'37. Duty of faU representation
A trade union or representative of a trade union
that is the bargaining agent for a bargaining unit
shail not act in a rnanner that is arbitrary,
discriminatory or in bad faith in the representation
of any of the employees in the unit with respect to
their rights under the collective agreement that is
applicable to them. '
The Court of Appeal of British Columbia, relying on the
analysis of the evolution of the duty of fair representation set
out in Gagnon, has clearly determined that there is no duty of
care on which a clairn for negligence rnay be made by a
member against his union other than that embraced by the duty
of fair representation. Bowcott v. Canadian Brotherhood of
Railwa~,Trans~ortand General Workers. Local 400 et al
(1988), 29 B.C.L.R. (2d) 198.
The corollary of the British Columbia decision in Bowcott is

that since the duty of fair representation is now a statutory duty
embodied in the Canada Labour Code, in matters such as the
instant case where the Code applies, exclusive jurisdiction to
determine whether a breach of such a duty has occurred lies
with the Canada Labour Relations Board and that the Supreme
Court of British Columbia has no jurisdiction to hear a claim
for negligence by a member against its union with respect to
the standard of care exercised in the course of representing a
member 's interests ,"

At this point in the judgment we see that Creaghan, J. has a clear grasp of

the issue confronting him. He is very cognizant of the distinction between
union actions arising out of its representation of a member vis-a-vis the
employer and other circumstances that might arise. Should he conclude a
standard of mere negligence applies to a union's representation of its
members in the face of codification he would be interpreting Gagnon
differently than did the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Bowcott, supra.
His Lordship continues:
"The New Brunswick Court of Appeal in Canadian Brotherhood
of Railway. Transport and General Workers et al v. Roger
Knkht et al ... adopted a less restrictive position. Although
clearly Knipht holds that a breach of the duv of fair
representation as defined by the Canada Labour Code falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Canada Labour Relations
Board , at the same time the New Brunswick Court of Appeal
found that there are other tortious acts founded in common law
which are independent of a statutory duty of fair representation

and for which an action may be properly brought within the

jurisdiction of the Court of Queen's Bench of New Brunswick
by a member against his union with respect to the manner in
which it represents his interests.
The causes of action are limited to those other than a breach of
the statutory duty of fair representation as set out in section 37
of the Canada Labour Code. In this category the court allows
daims alleging fkaud, deceit, misrepresentation and breach of
fiduciary duty but does not suggest that the specified causes of
action are an exhaustive list.
While the New Brunswick Court of A ~ p e din Knight does not
s~ecificall~
reference negligence as one of the tortious causes
of action that ma^ be brou . its apparent approval of the trial
iudge's remarks that the specified causes of action were "among;
others" gives rise to the inference that it has read Gagnon less
resaictivelv than was done b~ the Court of Appeal of British
Columbia in Bowcott. (emphasis added)
1 have concluded with some hesitation, based on the decision in

Kni~ht,that although Gamon does include "serious or major
negligence" within the context of the duty of fair
representation, the law in New Brunswick allows a further
cause of action based on a dutv of care bv which a union must
act in a reasonablv prudent and diligent manner in the
re~resentationof its members . (emphasis added)
This du@ of care is in addition to and not embraced bv the
statutory du- of fair representation set out in the Canada
Labour Code which provides o n l ~that a union shall not act in
a rnanner that is "arbitrarv. discriminato~or in bad faith in the
representation of any of the employees in the unit with respect
to their rights under the collective agreement that is applicable
to hem" . Knight, holds that there are other obligations of
conduct placed upon a union outside the statutory duty of fair
representation and the duty of fair representation founded in
cornmon law stated in Gagnon, seen in the context that a

"union's decision must not be arbiaary, capricious,
discriminatory or wrongful" . (emphasis added)
Even with the opening provided by Knight, 1 am aware that the
conclusion that a common law duty of care exists giving rise to
a claim for negligence against a union by a member nins
counter to the weight of authority.
It is clear that Canadian labour board jurisprudence has taken
the position that negligence does not constitute a breach of tke
duty of fair representation and that no further duty exists. It is
also clear that labour board jurispmdence has sbxggled with the
concept of negIigence as it should apply to union responsibility
in the representation of its members. "

After noting that his decision goes against the weight of authority,
Creaghan, J. then explained why the earlier considerations used to justiS a
lower standard were no longer relevant. He attacks certain assumptions that

are no longer relevant in today's society. He States:
"It must be recognized however that the duty of fair
representation both as defined in statute and as developed at
common law in Gagnon was Iimited by certain assumptions that
may not be as valid as they once were.

To see serious or gross negligence as arbitrary but to see
"simple" negligence as acceptable does not seem logical in the
environment of today's labour relations. First it imposes a
subjective standard that is bound to produce varying ad hoc
decisions on whether negligent conduct is sufficiently senous
conduct to be considered arbitrary. More importantly it is
based on the premise that union officials who represent their
members should not be held to a higher duty than that of the
duty of fair representation.

Today union officials are well trained in their responsibilities
and at the higher levels, where the responsibility for processing
grievances such as the instant case lies, they occupy full-time
positions and have ready access to information and expertise.
Union officials for the great part cannot be seen as
unsophisticated volunteers. The facts in this case, and the
manner of their testimony at mal, clearly indicates that the
union representatives responsible in the case were
knowledgeable and competent in dealing with the rights of their
members .
Nor c m it be realistically argued that the remedy for negligent
representation lies in the threat that representatives will be
replaced by the membership. The politics of union organization
is not that simple and further it offers no opportunity for relief
to the employee who has suffered as a result of negligent
representation.
It is no longer realistic to see a union in the context of some
fratemal organization where unsophisticated officers speak on
behalf of their membership. A mature union, such as the
defendant in this case, is a highly organized and professionally
managed institution well able to undertake its responsibility that
being the exclusive representation of the economic interests of
those it represents.
It is tnie that the standard of care must not be too demanding.
Union representatives should not be expected to act as lawyers.
In my view, however, I can see no reason why the standard of
reasonableness cannot be applied nor why union representatives
should not be held accountable for negligence just as would any
person who accepts the exclusive right and responsibility to
represent the rights of others and upon whom such persons rely
for the protection of their rights. To Say that a union must act
in a reasonably prudent and diligent manner is not too hi@ a
standard given the reality of the development of union
representation today .

Accordingly, 1 have decided that a union's breach of a duty to
act in a reasonably pmdent and diligent manner gives rise to an
action in negligence which falls outside the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Canada Labour Relation's (sic) Board and
which may be brought in the Court of Queen's Bench of New
Brunswick. "
Clearly, according to Mr. Justice Creaghan the modem, well-trained union
executive should not benefit from the lesser standard imposed upon it that
would require a member to prove senous or gross negligence in order to

found a cause of action against the union.
A third case from New Brunswick also lends support to the

proposition that a union is liable for negligent acts committed against its
membership, whether or not those acts constitute serious or major
negligence. In Gerald Dutcher v. Constructionand General Lubourers ' and
General Workers (Construction, Commercial, Industrial), Local Union IO79
and Labourers' International Union of North ~ r n e r i c athe
' ~ ~COURwas not

confronted with any statutorily defined duty of fair representation as was the
case in Duke and Gendron. The court found itself in the same position as
the Suprerne Court in Gagnon. That is, it codd define a standard of care

in the fused court of law and equity in a jurisdiction where the union's duty
had not been codified.

In Dutcher, the Court had the benefit of the

'" (199û), 110 N.B.R. (2d) 368 (Q.B.D.)(T.D.).
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decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in Gagnon, G e n d m , and Centre
Hospitalier Regina Ltee v. Prud'homme.
After carefully analyzing the various decisions of the Supreme Court
of Canada touching on the issue of the union duty of fair representation as
well as those of his fellow jurists in New Brunswick in Knight and Duke,

Mclntyre, J. concluded that a clairn based upon negligence could be brought
by a union member against his or her union. He concluded that the union

has a responsibiiity to act in a reasonably prudent and diligent manner in the
representation of its members .
The case for a more stringent standard upon trade unions adopted by
the courts in New Brunswick has recently found favour in the superior
courts of Saskatchewan and Newfoundland.
In Saskatchewan the cornmon law duty of fair representation was
codified by

S.

25.1 of the Trade Union ~ c t ' ~ ' .In Moldowan v.

Smkatchewan Governmenr Employees ' Union, et al1* the plaintiff s

grievance was disrnissed by reason of the defendant union's delay in
constituting the arbitration board. The plaintiff brought action against the

12'

R.S.S. 1978 c. T-17as amendeci.
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union alleging negligence or breach of the duty of fair representation under
the Trade Union Act. With respect to the c l a h in negligence, the court
concluded that since it was not clear whether negligence was covered under
the statutory definition of fair representation, the jurisdiction of the court in
the area of negligence was not ousted.

In concluding that the plaintiff could proceed before the superior court
with an action based upon breach of the union duty of fair representation in
this case, the court obsewed that the remedies available under the
Saskatchewan Trade Union Act were not as al1 inclusive as those available
undet the Canada Labour Code which were considered in Gendron.
Schiebel, J. noted that at page 13 19 of her decision in Gendron, L'Heureux-

Dubé, J. aclaiowledged the limits of her decision in the following terms:
"A necessary caveat to this conclusion is that,
while the common law duty will be inoperative in
a situation where the terms of the statute apply , a
different conclusion may be warranted in a case
where the statute is silent or by its tems cannot
apply."

This caveat was important to the trial judge as he compared the remedial

powers available under the Trade Union Acr of Saskatchewan with those
available under the Canada Labour Code.
Since the Saskatchewan Labour Relations Board did not have the
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power to award damages, it foilowed that the jurisdiction of the courts was
not ousted by reason of necessary implication.

The Legislature of

Saskatchewan had not expressed an intention to oust the jurisdiction of the
courts with irresistible clarity .lu

Not oniy did Scheibel J. conclude an action lay in the superior court
in Saskatchewan for breach of the duty of fair representation, he also

concluded an action lay grounded upon negligence other than that caught by
the ambit of the duty of fair representation.

He was of the view the

Legislature had not stated with irresistible clarity that common law
negligence was subsumed by the statutory duty of fair representation. Since
it was not, the jurisdiction of the court in the area of negligence had not

been ousted. l x
In Moldowan the union appealed. In the Saskatchewan Court of
Appeallzs decision, the trial judge's incisive reasoning was, with respect,
This test of irresistible clarity has been regularly employed in order to determine
whether the jurisdiction of the courts is ousted. See, for example, Goodyear Tire, [1956]
S.C.R. 610; Dominion C m e r s Ltd. v. Casrama, [1923] 1 D.L.R. 551 (S.C.C.);
Narionul T m CO. V . Christian Commfu~ityof Universal Brotherhood, [1944] 3 D.L.R.
529 (S.C.C.), [1941] S.C.R.601.
123

See also, Collins v. Transport di Allied Workers Union, Local 85.5 (1991), 92
C.L.L.C. 14018; 94 Nfld. & P.E.1.R 346 (Nfld.S.C.)(T.D.);and Bun v. United
Steelworkers of America, Local 5795 (1993), 106 Nfld. & P.E.1.R 181
(N£ld.S.C.)(T.D.).
'21
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subjected to an erroneous application of the facts and the law set out in
Gendron. The leamed justices concluded that since the Cu&

Labour Code

ousted the jurisdiction of the common law courts, so too must the
Saskatchewan Trade Union Act. This, in spite of the fact the duty of fair
representation is described differently in both statuteslt6; and, more
significantly, in spite of the fact that the Canada Labour Code made
widesweeping remedies available to the Canada Labour Relations Board,
including the power to award damages, which as noted, supra, were not

then available tu the Saskatchewan Labour Relations Board.
Bearing in mind that the Gagnon and Gendron cases define the duty

of fair representation and do not purport to determine whether a c l a h lay
in ordinary negligence against a union by a union member, it is troubling

that a Court possessed of inherent jurisdiction would so willingly abdicate
its jurisdiction in the field o f ordinary negligence. After referring to his
understanding of the common Law duty-of fair representation, Jackson, J. A.
concluded :
"Thus the common law duty has, as part of its
content, a prohibition against serious or major
negligence. There are not then two causes of
action: the common law breach of the duty of fair

''

See Appendix "A", infro.

representation and negligent representation.
Negligence is subsumed in the common law duty
to the extent of serious or major negligence. "
One must ask "Why?". What is there about a trade union that is by law
granted the capacity to sue and be sued that makes it immune fiom an action

in negligence?
The Court of Appeal in Moldowan, answered that question, in part,
by relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in St. Anne

Nackawic Pu@ & Paper Co. v. Canadian Paperworkers ' Union. Local 219,

supra. As noted earlier, the 3.Anne Nackmvic case was aiso relied upon by

L'Heureux-Dubé, J. in Gendron to justi@ the ousting of the jurisdiction of
the common law courts in the face of the legislative provisions of the
CanCLdQLabour Code.

With respect, the reliance upon the St. Anne Nackawic case by the
Supreme Court of Canada and the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal to deny
citizens access to the courts for wrongs cornmitted by unions against
members is not weil-founded. St. Anne Nackmvic examined the jurisdiction
of the courts to deal with various wrongs committed during a wild-cat strike.
The strike was contrary to the terms of the collective agreement which

g term. The
provided that there shall be no strikes or lock-outs d u ~ its
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employer sought to sue the union for damages. The court held that the
strike constituted a violation of the terms of the collective agreement.
Pursuant to section 55 of the Industriai Relations ~n~~~
of New

Brunswick, al1 disputes conceming the interpretation or application of the
collective agreement must be resolved by binding arbitration.

The

jurisdiction of the Court had thereby been ousted.
In the aftermath of St. Anne Nackawic it has been generally concluded
that in the master-servant relationship, al1 rnatters contemplated by a

collective agreement between the employer and employees must be dealt

with by arbitration. In the face of legislation requiring al1 disputes be settied
by binding arbitration, such a conclusion makes abundant good sense.

However, to use that case to attempt to resolve intra-union problems,
is, with respect, erroneous. Consider the features that distinguish the facts
in St. Anne NackQwic from those ir, MoMowan:

(i)

in St. Anne Nackawic the lis was between the employer and
employees; in Moldowan the lis was between a union and a
member served by it;

(ii)

in St. Anne Nackavic a written contract existed between the
--

'21
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two litigants; in Moldowm no written contract existed between

the two litigants;
(iii) in St. Anne Nackawic a strongly worded section of the
Industrial Relations Act provided that ail disputes between the

litigants arising out of the terms of the collective agreement
must be resolved by binding arbitration; in Moldowan no

provision of the Trade Union Act provided that disputes
between a union and its members must be resolved by the
Labour Relations Board;
(iv)

in St. Anne Nackawic the arbitrator possessed authority to

award damages; in Moldowan the Labour Relations Board had

no authority to award damages to the employee;
(v)

in St. Anne Nackavic there was no fiduciary duty of any kind
between the litigants, in fact, they were adversarial; in
Moldowan the employee relies upon the union to protect his or
her interest and is paying a fee by way of union dues to ensure
that happens;

(vi)

in St. Anne Nackawic a bargaining relationship existed between
the two parties. Legislation is written under the assumption
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they both corne to the bargaining table with strength; in
Moldowan no bargaining relationship exists between the
litigants. The union member is totally at the mercy of the

union.
Based upon the above analysis, it is subrnitted that any effort to apply
the principles of Sr. Anne Nackavic to the situation where an employee is
seeking to redress a perceived wrong against the union is dl- c o n ~ e i v e d . ' ~ ~
If the Parliament of Canada or the Legislatures of the Provinces wished to

bar actions against unions in such circumstances, there is substantial
precedent for the appropriate statutory language. The approach of the
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Moldowun, is, with respect, the result of
blind adherence to perceived precedent without a careful analysis of whether

or not the cases relied upon are tnily precedent-setting to the case under
review. As noted, even L'Heureux-Dubé, J. in Gendron urged caution in
applying her decision to other cases where the statute rnight read differently.
The St. Anne Nuckawic case was recently applied by the Supreme
Court of Canada in Weber v. Unturio HydrdZgand New Brunswick v.

See, Young v. United Mine Workers of Amencn, Local

D.L.R. (4th)489 (Sask. Q . B.).

'" (1995),125 D.L.R.(4th)583 (S.C.C.).

No. 7606 (1988), 48
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O'Lec~ry.'~~
Can it be said that those cases lend support to the proposition

that relief in simple negligence is unavaiiable to a union member who makes
a claim against his union? I would suggest to the contrary. Weber actually
assists in a small way those who argue a union should be liable for simple
negligence arising out of a union's representation of its members.

In Weber v. Ontario Hydro, the employer believed the plaintiff to be
malingering in relation to sick leave claims. The employer engaged a private

investigator who obtained access to the employee's home. As a result of the
investigation the employee was terrninated. His union filed a grievance
which was eventually settled prior to arbitration. However, in addition to
the filing of the grievance, Mr. Weber commenced a court action in which

he claimed damages for the torts of trespass, nuisance, deceit and invasion

of privacy. He also sued for breach of his section 7 and 8 rights under the
Cu&ian

Charter of Rights and ~reedorns.'~' At trial the employer's

motion to dismiss was granted on the basis that the dispute arose out of the
collective agreement. The Supreme Court of Canada agreed, citing St. Anne
Nackawic where Estey, J. concluded in part as follows:

(1995), 125 D.L.R. (4th) 609 (S.C.C.).
13*

Conmnmtution
Act, 1982.

"This relationship is properly regulated through
arbitration and it would, in generai, subvert both
the relationship and the statutory scheme under
which it aises to hold that matters addressed and
governeci by the collective ameement may
nevertheless be the subject of action in the courts
at common law ." L32 (emphasis added)

With respect, nothing new flows from Weber or O Zeary that would oust the
jurisdiction of the courts in matters relating to claims in simple negligence
by a member against his or her union.

In Weber, the Court accepted the exclusive jurisdiction mode1 which
holds that if the difference arises from the collective agreement, the claimant
must proceed by arbitration and the Courts have no power to entertain an
action in respect of that dispute. There can be no overlapping jurisdiction.
The Court also acknowledged it is impossible to categorize the classes of
cases that fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the arbitrator.
Interestingly, in identifjing those areas in which the courts Iack jurisdiction
McLachlin, J. writing for the majority at page 602 cited Burt in support of
her position that only disputes "expressly or inferentially arising out of the
collective agreement are foreclosed to the courts. "133 AS will be seen,

13*

Supra, note 129 at 599 (D.L.R.).

13'

Supra, note 129 at 603.

infia, in Buîi, L. D. Barry, J. concluded that an action lay at common law

in negligence in spite of Newfoundland's effort at codiQing the duty of fair
representation. The apparent acceptance of the decision in Bun would appear
to

nui

counter to the interpretation given to the Supreme Court of Canada

in such decisions and MoMowan and M u l h e k In fact Moldowan

specifically rejected the approach taken in Butt. Yet, as we have seen,
supra, the Supreme Court denied leave to appeal in Moldowan.
In the event the apparent acceptance of Bun, following its rejection in
Moldowan, is not confusing, consider the following excerpt from Mme.

Justice McLachlan at page 23 of Weber:
"This does not mean that the arbitrator will
consider separate "cases" of tort, contract or
charter. Rather, in dealing with the dispute under
the collective agreement and fashioning an
appropriate remedy,the arbitrator will have regard
to whether the breach of the collective agreement
also constitutes a breach of a common law duty or
of the Charter. " 134
1 fail to understand or appreciate why an arbitrator would be

concerned about whether a common law duty had been breached. Assuming
an arbitrator determined he or she had jurisdiction it would appear there is

'" While arbitrators right to determine breaches of Charter rights was confmned in
such mes as Douglar/KwuntZen Facul@ AssociahQnon
v. Douglas College (1990), 77
D.L.R. (4th) 94 1 am unaware that arbitrators determine breaches of common law duties.
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no room for consideration of common law duties. 1 know of no common law
duty enforceable by an arbitrator. If he has no jurisdiction to enforce a
common law remedy, then why would he or she find it necessary to "have
regard" to the issue of whether or not a common law duty had been
breached? Furthemore, the t h s t of St. Anne Nackawic, Gendron and
Weber was to deny access to common law remedies.
In those provinces where there is a statutory duty of fair

representation, there is no equivalent to section 55 of the New Brunswick
Industrial Relations Act or section 45 of the Ontario Lubour Relations

AC?'^^ cequiring al1 disputes between the union and its members be
governed by a dispute resolution process separate from the courts. It should
not be presumed that even in those jurisdictions where the duty of fair
representation has been codified, labour legislation is a complete statutory
scheme designed to govem a lis between a union and one of its members.
If the labour legislation enacted in each Province is to be a cornpiete
scheme goveming labour relations, it could be argued in the extreme that an
employer, upon being assaulted by an employee while at work over a
dispute about work assignment, would have no right to sue for assault.
-

'35
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Could it not be argued based upon a very smct interpretation of Weber and
St. Anne Nackavc that the employer could f i e the employee and grieve the

assauit?

But for the employee being at work and govemed by the

employment relationship, the assault would not have occurred. Such an
analysis is no more unreasonable, nor any less plausible than a reading of
St. Anne Nackawic that would apply it to intra-union problems when that

case's sole focus was on the employer-union relationship and the
interpretation of the New Brunswick Industrial Relations Act, that, on its
face, did appear to oust the jurisdiction of the courts.
It is achowledged that the weight of judicial authority holds there is
no actionable ton, regardless of the standard to be applied, against a union
for breach of the duty of fair representation where that duty has been
each statute should be carefully examined for
~ 0 d i f i e d . I ~However,
~
purposes of determining the exact wording of the codification and the
remedies available, if any. Only after such an examination is made c m one
tmly opine whether the jurisdiction of the courts is ousted. This approach

is consistent with the instruction from McLachlin, J. in Weber, supra.
The analysis adopted by L.D . Barry, J. in Bun v. United Steelworkers

'36

Supra, note 110.
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of Amerka et alL3' which appears to have the approval of the Supreme

Court in Weber, is the preferred approach. In that case Justice Barry
conducted a very careful analysis of the language of section 126 of the
Newfoundland Labour Relations AC^, 1

3 ~ that

being the Newfoundland

codification of the duty of fair representation. Justice Barry considered the
following factors to be relevant in concluding that the jurisdiction of the
common law courts was not ousted by
1.

S.

126:

Gagnon was not a negligence case and the reference to

negligence was not necessary for that decision;
2.

conduct falling short of bad faith is not necessarily covered by
S.

3.

126;

St. Anne Nackawic is distinguished because the Newfoundland

Labour Relations Board is not given exclusive jurisdiction over
" simple negligence" ;
4.

because the Newfoundland Labour Relations Act does not deal
with "simple" negligence cases it is not a "code governing al1
aspects of labour relations" .

'" Supra, note 124; cited with approvai in P a v e c. ~ s s i o des
n écoles
catholiques [1997] A.Q. No. 1273 and Déry c. Montréal (Nord) [1997] A.Q. No. 1540.
13'

S.N. 1977,c . 64, as arnended.

95

In Bun the court found the union was liable in simple negligence for having
missed a limitation period. It did not meet its duty to act in a reasonably
prudent and diligent marner.
The Nova Scotia courts appear to have adopted an approach similar
to that taken in New Brunswick and Newfoundland. In Nova Scotiu Union
of Public Employees, Local 2 v. Kendall et

Kendall sued his

employer and his union seeking retum of insurance premiums improperly
paid by him. Clearly, the Court lacked jurisdiction to deal with the claim
against the employer given the matter was sornething that could have been
dealt with through the arbitration process. However, both at trial and in the
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, the Courts recognized Kendall's right to sue
his union in negligence.
The issue of a mernber's right to pursue a clairn based upon "mere

negligence" was squarely placed before the Court. At trial, Stewart, J. set
out the union's position:
"Havingundertaken due diligence and acted within
its jurisdiction as set out in the Constitution, the
union submits it should not be subject to a claim

Nova Scotia Union of Public Employees, Local 2 v. Kendall, et al (1996)148
NSR (2d) 51 (T.D.);
(1996)152 NSR (2d) 76 (C.A.).
lZ9
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against it on the basis of 'mere negligence .fi140
3

The court rejected that contention and concluded there was no basis

upon which to limit the union's liability to circumstances of gross
negligence.
The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's decision in
Kendall. However, it did qualify its decision by acknowledging that the

dispute between the union and Kendall did not arise out of any collective
agreement with the employer. The policy for which premiums were
erroneously paid was arranged exclusively by the union.
Given the development of unionization in the past 50 years, the
conclusions reached by Creaghan, J. in Duke, Mchtyre, J. in Dutcher and
Barry, J. in Bun make eminently good sense. In the event the Supreme

Court of Canada was attempting to limit wrongs for which a member could
sue his union out of some sense of benevolence toward the trade union
movement, it was acting upon a misunderstanding of the modem trade
union. Modem unionisrn benefits fiom sophisticated organization, national
offices with regional representatives, full or part-time staff, lawyers on
retainer and organizers who are also paid employees.

'* Supra, note 139 at 59 (N.S.R.).

In the event the Supreme Court of Canada was Iabouring under any

misunderstanding, it is submitted that misunderstanding is fostered in large
part by the specialized mbunals designed to deal with labour relations.
Ofrentimes those boards have taken and continue to take a paternalistic
attitude as it relates to union matters. The attitude that the boards must be
the keeper and protector of the trade union rnovement is not stated any more
clearly than in the H a l q case. Consider, for example, the following excerpt
from the majority decision:

"Ourview is that in 1978 when Parliament enacted
the duty of fair representation it must be taken to
have viewed unions as participatory entities which,
although vested with exclusive bargaining authority
for certain units of employees, must aiso act as the
instruments to foster, preserve, and further the
laudable purposes expressed in the Preamble. They
do this in a social and economic context where a
lack of funding, education, staffing and
participation is a real, every day fact of life. " 141
A careful review of the case does not demonstrate any evidence of

underfunding or lack of staff. Further, there was no evidence called
demonstrating the degree of volunteerism or democracy in the union. Such
conclusions made on the basis of misplaced judicial notice form the basis
upon which the labour boards and some courts seem to have defined the

14'

Supra, note 66 at 509 (C.L.R.B.R.).

duty of fair representation. To adopt such an approach in the nineties is
unredistic.

In the current economic climate, there are few organizations that
would admit to being adequately financed and adequately staffed. Based

upon a review of fifieen trade unions operating in the Province of New
Brunswick, only two used exclusiveIy volunteer help. The other thirteen
hire professionals whose tasks include organizing, managing collective
agreements and fihg grievances .142
In Haley the Board also suggested that unions are extremely
democratic. Some may not agree with that suggestion. There is not one
single jurisdiction in Canada that requires a secret ballot on al1 contract
offers. Until very recentiy, in New Brunswick at least, two major trade
unions took the position that members charged with violating the union's
discipline code could not be represented by the lawyer of their choice. 1s

'"

The following trade unions have paid staff operating within the Province of New
Brunswick: 1. Canadian Union of Public Employees, 2. Communications Energy &
Paperworkers' Union; 3. Canadian Auto Workers,4. United Brotherhood of Carpenters
& Joiners of America, 5. United Association of Plumbers & Pipefitters, 6. Sheet Metal
Workers' International Association, 7. Labourers' International Union, 8. New
Brunswick Public Employees Association, 9. Professional Institute of the Public Service,
10. National Union of Government Employees, 11. International Union of Operating
Engineers, 12. United Steelworkers' of America, 13. Teamsters International Union. The
two unions that relied exclusively upon volunteers were the Fredericton Police
Association and the Association of New Brunswick Professional Educators.
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that being extremely democratic?143
Another erroneous argument in Haley which the Board uses to justiQ
imposing a standard of serious or major negligence before a union can be
found liable for breach of the duty of fair representation is that an employee
has greater recourse under the Code than he or she did before the courts.
At page 510 (C.L.R.B.R.)the majority in Haley opined:
"It may be said this result (major negligence
requirement) is unfair because it leaves the
individual with no recourse and the union
unaccountable for its wrong. This is tme but
overlooks that in the absence of section 136.1 the
individual had less recourse against the union or

employer. "
With respect, the statement that in the absence of section 136.1 (now section
37) of the Canada Labour Code an individual had less recourse against the

union is simply not accurate. The courts, possessed of inherent jurisdiction,
starting with Fisher v. Pemberton and later in Gagnon, were quite prepared

to recognize a remedy for an aggrieved union member. Given the fiduciary
nature of the relationship that remedy could include an order that a matter
proceed to arbitration. We have seen, quite ironicdly, that codification of

'" See, Wark v. Green, Boaslq and Chnadian Union of Public Employees, Local
1506 (1985). 66 N.B.R. (2d) 77 (C .A.); and Clark v. PZumbers and Pipefiners Union,
Local 213 (1988), 89 N.B.R. (2d) 425, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refuseci (1989),91
N.B.R. (2d) 90n (S.C.C.).
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the duty has hindered courts who are attempting to protect union members

h m negligent acts of their union executive?
Finally, even if this latter argument is m e , it is of little solace to a
dismissed employee who has lost the right to grieve his dismissal that
several years earlier he or she may have been without a remedy.
There is no doubt that labour board decisions have had a serious
impact upon the Supreme Court of Canada as it stniggled with the definition

of the appropriate standard to impose in cases of alleged unfair
representation. This is understandable given the varying responses of the
Legislatures and Parliament after the decision in Fisher v. Pemberton.

I"

110.

See, for example, trial decisions in Mulherin and Moldowan, supra, at note

Union Duty Of Fair Accommodation

We have seen in the past quarter of a century the courts and

legislators develop standards by which unions are requUed to conduct
themselves . Those standards are variously enforceable before labour
tribunals and the courts. in addition tu the union's duty toward its members

flowing fkom labour legislation, fiduciary relationships , neighbourliness

principles, and contract law, trade unions are also subject to human rights
legislation that has been implemented in every Canadian jurisdiction.
Each hurnan rights statute in Canada prohibits a trade union fkom
discriminating with respect to union membership. Although the protected
classes Vary from Province to Province, it is generally accepted that a union
cannot discriminate because of an individual's race, religion, sex, colour,
et cetera.'" The recent development of the union duty to accommodate

'"

Canadian H u m Righrs A b , R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6 S. 9,lO;Individual Righrs'
Protection A a R.S.A. 1980, c. 1-2 S. 10;Hummi Rights Act S.B.C. 1984,c. 22 S. 9 ;
Hwuui Rights Code S.M. 1987-1988c . 45,S. 14(6); Human Righrs A n , R.S.N.B. 1973
c. H-11s.3(3); Human Rights Code, R.S.N. 1990, c. H-14,S. 9(3); Humm,Rights ACT,
R.S.N.S. 1989 c. 214 S. 9; Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990 c. H-19 S. 6; Human
Rights Acî, R.S.P.E.I. 1988 c. H-12c. 8; Saskatchewan Hwnan Rights Co& S . S . 1979
c. S-24.1 S. 18; Charter of Hurnan Rights and Freedom, R.S.Q. 1977 c. C-12,S. 17.
See Appendix B.
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provides increased statutory protection to union members in all provinces

and thereby becomes an integral part of the context within which the duty
of fair representation will continue to develop in the Maritime Provinces.
W e employer violations of human rights statutes have been the
subject of board hearings and court proceedings for many years, it has only
been recently that unions find thernselves the subject of complaints before
provincial and federal human rights boards. These complaints are often the
result of dissatisfaction with the employer's action or lack of action in
situations where collective agreements entered into by the union and the
employer have a negative impact upon a p h c u l a r religious or ethnic group
that is not felt by the majority. What has become known as adverse effect
discrimination flows from a situation where an employer, presumably with
the concurrence of the union, makes a mle or s i p a collective agreement

in d l honesty, for sound econornic and business reasons, with absolutely no
intention to discriminate on the basis of one of the prohibited grounds.
However, if in the course of implementing or enforcing that d e , someone
protected by a prohibited ground of discrimination is negatively affected,
that person or group suffers from what has become known as adverse effect

Where a person is the victim of adverse effect discrimination, the
human rïghts mbunals have concluded there is a duty to accommodate that

individual. Any analysis of the duty to accommodate must commence with
the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Re Bhinder and C.N.R.

Co.14' Bhinder, a practising Sikh, was required by his religious tenets to
Wear a turban and no other head covering. The employer required he Wear
a hard hat on the job site where he worked as a maintenance elecmcian.
When the cornplainant refused to Wear a hard hat, he was dismissed. The

employer clairned the hard hat mie was a bona jfde occupational
qualification and there was therefore no discrimination. Bhinder complained
to the Canadian Human Rights Commission alleging discrimination by

reason of his religion. The Commission appointed a human rights tribunal
which held hearings and concluded that Bhinder shouid be awarded $14,500

in compensation and reinstated to his position shouid he so desire.
Canadian National Railway sought judicial review before the Federal

'" Re

Ontario Human Rights CommmLssion
and O'Mallq v . SUnpsonr Sears Ltd.
(1985), 23 D.L.R. (4th) 321 at 332 (S.C.C.).

'"

(1985), 23 D.L.R. (4th) 481 (S.C.C.).
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Court of Appeal pursuant to section 28 of the Federd Court AC?.'" The

Federal Court of Appeal concluded that the requirement that one Wear a
hard hat while at work was not a discriminatory practice within the meaning

of the Canadian H14man Rights Act. It held that only intentional
discrimination is forbidden by the GzIMdim Human Rights Act.'49 The
Supreme Court of Canada disagreed and concluded that unintentional acts,

otherwise lawfkl that discriminate agaïnst individuals are violative of the

Hwnan Rights Act.lS0Adverse effect discrimination and direct, intentional
discrimination are both to be guarded against in Canadian society.
Having found that Canadian National had discriminated against Mr.

Bhinder, the Supreme Court of Canada then had to deal with Canadian
National Railway's argument that the wearing of a hard hat was a bona fide
occupational qualification pursuant to paragraph 14(a) of the H u m n Rights
Act. The majority agreed with the submission by Canadian National and

concluded as follows:

". . . if a working condition is established as a
bona
148

fide

occupationai

requirement,

the

R.S.C. 1970, c.10 (2nd Supp.).

Re C.N.R.and Canadian Human Rights Commission (1983), 147 D.L.R. (3d) 312
(Fed. C.A.).; overturned, see supra, note 147.
149

Supra, note 147 at 501.

consequential discrimination, if any, is permitted or,probably more accurately - is not considered
under S. 14(a) as being discriminatory."
Because the courts concluded the wearing of a hard hat was a bona
fide qualification of the work Bhinder was required to do, it did not consider

the question of whether the employer owed Bhinder a duty to accommodate

In Bhinder the Supreme Court of Canada could have easily imposed

a duty of reasonable accommodation upon the employer. The facts strongly
supported such a conclusion, given the cornplainant could have been

assigned to other duties as a maintenance elecmcian. Instead, the court
concluded that where a bona fide occupational qualification is established
there is no duw to accommodate the employee. This conclusion has been
criticized by the authors of Ernployment Law In Canada. ls2 As they point
out, the complainant's duties were not unique, there was an ample supply
of maintenance electricians and he could have been relocated to a non-hard

hat area.
The Bhinder decision contrasts with that of another 1985 decision of

15'

Supra, note 147 at 500.

'52 England, Christie & Christie, Employm~nrLaw in
edition Toronto: 1993 at page 5.55.

(nnada

Butterworths 3rd
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the Supreme Court in O 'Malley v. Simpson Sears Ltd. 153 OyMalley, a

Seventh Day Adventist, refused to work fiom sunset on Friday until sunset
on Saturday. Full time clerks were required to work two Saturdays in a row
in order to have the third off. As a result of OyMalley'srefusal, she was

demoted to the position of part-time clerk which resulted in loss of
employment benefits. The facts in O'MalZey clearly constituted a case of
adverse effect discrimination in that no mie was specifically formulated
which prevented Seventh Day Adventists from obtaining employment or
working full time. The employer had no malicious motive and there was no
evidence of direct discrimination. The employer terminated O'Malley's full
tirne employment and reduced her to part-tirne hours.

O'Malley brought a cornplaint before the Ontario Human Rights
Commission alleging discrimination based upon creed contrary to paragraph
4(1)(g) of the Ontario Human Rights Code I981.lS4 Unlike the case in

Bhinder, the employer could not allege the shift schedule was a 6ona fide
occupational qualification since that defense was not then available for
discrimination based upon creed.

lS3

(1985), 23 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (S.C.C.).

'" R.S.O. 1990, C. H-19.

f 07
As in Bhinder, a board of inquhy held O'Malley was the victim of

adverse effect discrimination. Furthemore, the Board held the employer had
a duty of reasonable accommodation to the employee. The Board dismissed

the cornplaint in concluding the Commission had not established the
employer acted unreasonably in its efforts to accommodate the employee.
As in the Federal Court of Appeal in Bhinder, the Ontario Court of
Appeal in O'Malley concluded the Ontario legislation prohibited only
intentional discrimination. The legislation did not prohibit adverse effect
discrimination
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada the four central issues

were:
1.

is unintentional discrimination that adversely
effects an employee prohibited by the Ontano
Human Rights Code 1981;

2.

presuming such conduct is discriminatory within
the language of the Code, is there a duty to
accommodate the employee;

3.

presuming there is a duty to accommodate, where does the onus
lie, upon the Commission to prove the failure to accommodate
or upon the employer to prove it made a reasonable effort to
accommodate the employee; and

138 D.L.R. (3d) 133 (Ont. C.A.); overtumed (1985), 23 D.L.R. (4th) 321
(S.C.C.).
lS

4.

what is the nature of the duty to accommodare.

As in the development of the law with respect to the duty of fair
representation, the Supreme Court of Canada drew upon the American
experience. Citing with approval the American jurisprudence in Greggs v.
Duke Power Co.1S6the Court answered in the affirmative to questions 1

and 2, supra.
With respect to the third question raised above, the court concluded

as follows:
"Accepting the proposition that there is a duty to
accommodate imposed on the employer, it
becomes necessary to put some realistic limit upon
it. The duty in a case of adverse effect
discrimination on the basis of religion or creed is
to take reasonable steps to accommodate the
complainant, short of undue hardship: in other
words, to take such steps as may be reasonable to
accommodate without undue interference in the
operation of the employer's business and without
undue expense to the employer. 157
1r

In its description of adverse effect discrimination, the Supreme Court

of Canada also offered an interesting comparison between adverse effect
discrimination and direct discrimination:

lS6

401 U.S. 424 (1970).

'"

Supra, note 153 at 335.

"Cases such as this raise a very different issue
fkom those which rest on direct discrimination.
Where direct discrimination is shown the employer
must justiQ the rule, if such a step is possible
under the enactment in question, or it is struck
down. Where there is adverse effect discrimination
on account of creed the offending order or nile
will not necessarily be smck down. It will survive
in most cases because its discriminatory effect is
limited to one person or one group, and it is the
effect upon them rather than upon the general
work force which must be considered. In such
cases there is no question of justification raised
because the mie, if rationally comected to the
employment, needs no justification; what is
required is some measure of accommodation. The
employer must take reasonable steps toward that
end which may or may not result in full
accommodation. Where such reasonable steps,
however, do not fully reach the desired end, the
complainant, . . . short of accomrnodating steps on
his own part . . . must either sacrifice his religious
principles or his employment. "lS8
With respect to the fourth question facing the Court in O'Malley, the
Court concluded the onus is upon the employer to establish what steps, if
any, were taken to accommodate the employee and, furthemore, at one
point would additional steps cause "undue hardship" upon the employer.
Since the employer called no evidence on either issue before the Board
of Inquiry, the Court allowed the appeal and ordered compensation be paid
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to Ms. O'Malley.
While there was never any doubt that the development of the concept

of adverse effect discrimination in such cases as Bhinder and O'MaIZey
applied with equal force to trade unions it was not until the decision in
Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta Human Rights ~ornmission'" that
the Supreme Court of Canada specifically made reference to trade unionism

and the fact that the duty to accommodate might include modifications to
collective agreements.
In Central Alberta Dairy Pool, an employee, Mr. Christie, became a

member of the Worldwide Church of God. His religion forbade him fmm
working on the Sabbath and other holy days, including Easter Monday.
Although the employer had taken some steps to accommodate Mr. Christie
in the past, that was not possible on Mondays given the onerous operational
requirements of that day of the week. The employer advised Mr. Christie
to attend work on Easter Monday or he would be fired. The employee failed

to attend work and was terminated. lm
Mr. Christie filed a cornplaint pursuant to ss. 7(1) of the Individual's
-

-

'"

-

[1990]2 S.C.R. 489.

There was some debate about whether Mr. Christie was a baptized follower of
his faith. However. that debate is not relevant for purposes of this paper.
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Rights Protectrgon AC^'^' before the Alberta Human Rights Commission.

The Board of Inquiry concluded Christie was the victim of adverse effect
discrimination, which conduct was not saved by the bom fide occupational
qualification defence. In both the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench16' and
the Alberta Court of AppeallQ the courts concluded that regular attendance
at the place of employment was a bow fide occupational qualification

pursuant to subsection 7(3) of the Act and overturned the Board of Inquiry.

In the Supreme Court of Canada as in the courts below, taking the
opportunity provided by Bhinder, the employer argued that the requirement
to work on Easter Monday was a bonafide occupational qualification. It
argued the courts were thereby precluded from considering whether the
employer had made reasonable efforts to accommodate the employee. The
employer argued, relying upon Bhinder, that given the establishment of a
bonafide occupational qualification there was no duty to accommodate the

employee.

The Supreme Court of Canada, however, disagreed and

reversed, in part, its decision in Bhinder. Madame Justice Wilson, speaking
for the majority, concluded that the duty to accommodate exists whether or
-

16'

Supra, note 145.

la

(1986),45 Alm. L.R. (2d) 325 (Q.B.).
[1989]1 W.W.R.78 (A1ta.C.A.).
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not a bonafide occupational qualification has been established in cases of
adverse effect discrimination. However, no such duty arises in cases of
direct discrimination.
In other words, an employer may deliberately discriminate against an

employee, successfully raise the bonafide occupational qualification defence
and have no duty to accommodate the affected ernployee. However, the

same employer who inadvertently discriminates against an empioyee and
successfully raises the bom jide occupational defence does have a duty to
accommodate. Ironically, the duty to accommodate arises where there is
adverse effect discrimination and not direct and deliberate discrimination.
Any question of compensation to those effected by direct discrimination ends

with the conclusion there exists a bona fide occupational qualification.

The Central Albem Dairy Pool decision is of extreme importance to
the trade union movement given another conclusion made by Madame

Justice Wilson. There, she attempts to define the extent to which parties
(employers and trade unions) to collective agreements must accommodate
employees adversely affected by an employer d e , whether or not a bom
fide occupational qualification is established. Iudge Wilson concludes that

IM

Supra, note 159.

113
the duty to accommodate extends to the point of creating hardship, albeit not

undue hardship. Some factors to be considered in determining whether or

not there is undue hardship are the following:
"the financial costs to the firm, the magnitude of
any safety risks, the demee to which collective
agreements would be dismpted. the impact on the
morale of emplo~ees,and the interchangeability of
the work force and other facilities.
(emphasis
added)

hterestingly, the rnajority were quite willing to hypothesize about adjusting
the terms of collective agreements but were unwilling to provide specifics

concerning the extent to which employers and trade unions will be expected
to go in accommodating employees.
With respect, the approach adopted by Sopinka, J. writing for the
dissent in Central Alberta Dairy Pool is the preferred one. He noted there
is no distinction in Canadian human rights legislation between direct and
indirect (or adverse effect) discrimination. That is, discrimination is
discrimination, without qualification or distinction. Any question of a duty
to accommodate could therefore be subsumecl into a determination of
whether or not a bona fide occupational qualification is established.

As the law currently exists, regardless of whether or not a bonafide
165

Note 159 at 521.
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occupational qualification is established, a trade union can find itself jointly
liable with an employer if it does not make sufficient effort to accommodate

an employee adversely affected by the terms of a collective agreement. This

was the situation faced by the Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local
573 in Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud.166Renaud is

effectively the first decision of the Supreme Court of Canada to address a

trade union's duty to accommodate, the extent to which it is expected to
accommodate and the implications of accommodation upon free collective
bargaining .

In Renaud, the Supreme Court of Canada had the opportunity to
address the issue of the duty to accommodate arising from operation of the
British Columbia Human Rights Act!'

It is also the first Canadian case

to deal specifically with a union's duty to accommodate.

Renaud's religious beliefs forbade him from working from sundown

on Friday night to sundown Saturday. He applied for and was successfbl in
obtaining a position at Spring Valley Elementary School where he was
required to work the 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. shift Monday to Friday . Renaud and

'61

[1992] 2 S.C.R. 970.

'61

S.B.C. 1984 C. 22.

115

his pastor went to see the employer immediately after Renaud learned he had
been successful in his job application. The employer agreed to accommodate
Renaud's request and was willing to alter the Friday evening shift. Such an
alteration, however, would have been in clear contradiction to the rems of
the collective agreement entered into between the employer and the union.

At a meeting of the trade union, it was agreed that a policy grievance would
be filed should the employer place any employee on a Sunday to Thursday
shift.

Faced with opposition from the union, the employer left the shift
scheduie intact. The employer tenninated Renaud when he failed to attend
work on Fnday evening.
Renaud filed a cornplaint against both the employer and the union with
the British Columbia Council of Human Rights who upheld the cornplaint
and ordered Renaud be reinstated and paid compensation. The employer and
the union both sought judicial review. The British Columbia Court of
Appeal, relying upon Bhinder, agreed with the lower court's ruling that the
requirement to work the Friday shift from 3 p.m.

- 11 p.m. was a bona fide

occupational qualification and rejected the appeal.
Mr. Justice Sopinka clearly stated the issues and the potential

implications of any decision the Court might make in the opening paragraph
of his judgment. He cautioned as follows:
"The issue raised in this appeal is the scope and
content of the duty of an employer to
accommodate the religious beliefs of employees
and whether and to what extent that duty is shared
by a cade union. While this duty has been
recognized and discussed as it relates to employers
... little judicid consideration has been given to
the question raised by the involvement of a
collective agreement and a cemfied trade union.
1s a trade union liable for discrimination if it
refuses to relax the provisions of a collective
agreement and thereby blocks the employer's
attempt to accommodate? Must the employer act
unilaterally in these circumstances? These are
issues that have serious im~lications for the
unionized workplace. " (emphasis added)
Applying its decision in CentralAlberta Dairy Pool, the court defined
the duty resting on an employer as requiring measures short of undue

hardship. Rather than define the duty in positive terms, the Court applied

a negative definition. "Short of undue hardship" imports a limitation on the
employer's obligation so that measures that occasion undue interference with
the employer's business or undue expense are not required.

Undue

interference and undue expense are issues of fact to be deterrnined by the
trier of fact.
-

'"

-

Supra, note 166 at 975.
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Although no definition of undue interference and undue expense is
proffered by the Court it does clearly reject the definition adopted by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Tram World Airlines Inc. v.
Hardisen.'61

That test holds that where an employer is required to incur more than
minimal cos6 then an undue hardship is incurred. The "de minimus" test

espoused by Hardisen was rejected in both O'MalZey and R e ~ u d .
The Supreme Court of Canada concluded the de minimus test would
virtually remove any duty to accommodate. As a result of the decision in

Renaud there are at least three components to the duty to accommodate in

Canada:
1.

more than negligible effort is required to satisQ the duty;

2.

sornething less than undue hardship is required;

3.

the employer and the union must go to "reasonable" efforts to

accommodate and in each case "reasonableness" is a question
of fact that will vary in the circumstances.
Significat about the Renaud decision is the fact that by and of itself, the

potential breach of a
-

'"

-

- -

C O ~ C ~agreement
V ~

-

432 U.S. 63 (1977).

does not constitute undue

il8

hardship. It is no defense to a claim of adverse effect discrimination that
the union and the employer were ad idem with respect to the terms of a
collective agreement and that the employer feared the filing of a grievance
if it did accommodate the complainant.
What does this mean to the made union movement? A union can be
liable for discriminatory conduct in one of two ways.

Firstly, if it

participates in the formulation of the discriminatory rule, and, secondly, if
it impedes the employer in efforts to accommodate the aggrieved employee.
The defence of bona fide occupational requirement can be raised by the

employer but is unavailable to the union. This poses special problems for
a made union against whom an accusation of discriminatory conduct has
been made.
At least one autl~or''~has suggested placing such liability upon a

union is unfair given that it is a fiction (as stated in Renaud) that in
Collective agreements "al1 provisions are formulated jointly by the
parties."171It has been suggested that there is not a joint formulation of
provisions because employers control the capital, control the place of work

Michael Lynch and Richard Eilis, Unions and the D w to Accommodate, I Can.
Lab. Law Journal 238.
'O

17'

(1992) 92 CLLC 17032 at page 16,258.

119

and benefit nom strongly worded management rïghts clauses. ln

One cannot fault the conclusion made by the Supreme Court of
Canada that unions and employers should not be able to effectively contract
out of human rights obligations. Otherwise the end result could be human
rights violations justified by agreement of the parties which would bring us

full circle to the railway cases referred to earlier in this paper.ln
It is, however, respectfùlly submined that for purposes of the remedy
available no distinction should be made between direct discrimination and
adverse effect discrimination. In a multi-cultural society such as Canada it
is becorning increasingly difficult to direct one's rnind to al1 the possible

unintended adverse effects that might flow from the language of a collective
agreement.
The duty to accommodate as it has developed should be collapsed into

a determination of whether or not a bonajide occupational requirement has
been established. This, regardless of whether the discrimination is direct or
indirect. Assurning such a requirement has been established, there is no need
for any M e r investigation. Assuming it has not, it follows there is liability

-

ln

- -

Supra, note 170.
See. supra, notes 1 aad 7.
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upon any party responsible for the discrimination, regardless of whether it
is the employer or the union. Whiie the efforts of the courts to be fair and
just to al1 concemed is laudable, the recent applications of the duty to
accommodate ignore the reality of Canadian society.

In many parts of Canada today employers could spend more time and
money accommodating the diverse interests of the work force than otherwise
managing the enterprise.
Life for the vast majority of Canadians must continue relatively
unimpeded by the extreme religious views of fellow Canadians. Perhaps
father's week-end visit with his child on a Saturday is just as important a
value to foster as the religious custom of a Seventh Day Adventist, Baptist,
Catholic, Jew, Muslim et cetera. Perhaps an employer's desire to ensure
safety in the work place is just as important a value to foster as someone's
right to Wear the religious attire he or she feels obIiged to Wear. Perhaps
a mother's desire to be with her children during their M a c h break, to which
she is entitied because of seniority, is a value worth fostering that is no less
important that someone's desire to attend Easter services but who does not
yet have the requisite seniority to have the day off. These are value

judgments unions and employers are quite capable of deciding without
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excessive interference fiom human rights tribunals.
The development of the union duty to accommodate is the result of

what I refer to as administrative tribunal law making.
Human rights aibunals and the Courts appear to have given life to a

concept never contemplated by the Legislator. Will Canadian law continue
to develop in this direction? Will administrative mbunals continue to
exercise the influence and power demonstrateci in the study of the duty to
accommodate? These are questions that are extremely difficult to answer.
Furthemore, a proper anaiysis of those issues would no doubt constitute a
thesis in and of itself.
However, the issues raised in this thesis, including the apparent
willingness of the courts to accept ouster of their jurisdiction and the method
by which an onerous duty to accommodate has developed, have led to the
development of the next chapter.
Given some of the judicial pronouncements discussed, infia, it is my
view human rights tribunals and labour relations boards can look forward
to more, rather than less, judicial and legislative control.

Judicial Development of Unions' Duties Strengthened:
A Check on the Power of Labour Tribun*

We have seen the courts' willingness to conclude ouster of their
jurisdiction in cases where there was no explicit instruction from the
Legislator. We have also observeci the courts gram to human rights tribunals

a certain "inherent" jurisdiction under the guise of statutory interpretation.
The result has been a tremendous opportunity for administrative tribunal law

making.

Unlike the duty of fair representation, the duty to accommodate was
not a judicial creation. However, the judiciary gave it life by endorsing it
and accepting that human rights tribunal had the cornpetence to create such

a concept even in the absence of specific legislative a~th0rity.l'~It no
doubt seerned a reiatively minor extension of the mbunai created concept of
adverse effect discrimination. Note, however, there is no legislative
authority that adverse effect discrimination is even "discrimination" as
contemplated by the various human rights statutes. Like the duty to
accommodate this too is an example of administrative tribunal law making.

'"

See, Bhinder, supra, note 147.
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It is submitted the confidence displayed by such tribunals in "making law"
cm be attributed to three distinct and recent developments in Canadian law:
1.

the degree of curial deference afforded tribunals when acting
within the scope of their jwisdiction.

2.

decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada that pennit mbunals
to determine the constitutionality of statutory provisions under
section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982,'"

3.

decisions of the courts concluding its jurisdiction had been
ousted without very clear language to that effect. The best
example of this is to be found in the Saskatchewan Court of
Appeal decision in Maldowan.

It would appear that courts in New B m w i c k have been the most

vigilant in ensuring their jurïsdiction is not ousted expect by clear and
unequivocal instruction from the Legislature.'71
In the preceding chapters 1 have demonstrated how the union duty of
fair representation, once transplantecl to Canadian soil, quickly evolved and

advanced even further than Amencan jurisprudence in protecting union
members from wrongs committed by the executive. Canadian judicial
development of the duty has, however, been slowed by codification in most
Cd@ Chich Ltd. v. Omri0 (Labour Relations Board) (1991). 81 D.L.R. (4th)
121 (S.C.C.).119911 2 S.C.R. 5; Teireauil-Gadoury v. Guiada (Ernployment &
Immigration Commission) (1991). 81 D.L.R.(4th) 358 (S.C.C.),[1991]2 S.C.R.22;
Douglas/Kwantien Faculty Association v . Douglas College ( IWO), 77 D .L.R. (4th) 94
'.71

(S.C.C.).

'"

See, for example, supra, notes 119. 120.
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provinces and the federal jurisdiction as well as by increased protection to
union members under human rights legislation. Judicial development of the
duty, even if the Maritime Provinces, was recently threatened by efforts of
the New Brunswick Labour and Employment Board to assume jurisdiction

over allegations of unfair representation even in the absence of
codification.
Although the New Brunswick Industrial Relations Act contains no
codification of the union duty of fair representation. It does however,
contain a provision specifically requiring that accredited employer
organizations fairly represent d l employers bound by an accreditation
order.'"

Until the recent decision of the New Brunswick Labour and

Employment Board in Laviolette v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of Amerka, Local 1023178New Brunswick practitioners had clear

direction from the Court that its jurisdiction had not been subsumed by the
Labour and Employment Board.
However, in Laviolene, Kuttner, Vice Chair of the Labour and
Employment Board attempted to clothe the Board with jurisdiction in rnatters

ln

R.S.N.B. c.14 ss. 51(1).

'" (1997), 97 C.L.L.C. 220-027 at 143. 306 (N.B. Lab. & Emp. Bd.).
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involving alleged breaches of the union duty of fair representation.
The facts in La Violerte were relatively straightforward. LaViolette, a

carpenter by trade, received assignments based upon referrais from his
union, otherwise known as a hiring hall. On May 13, 1996 LaViolette
received a referral to attend work at Dalhousie, New Brunswick for On-Site
Mechanical Ltd. When he was laid off some five days later he complained
that relatives of the business manager were still working. He alleged he was
not being treated fairly by his union. Mr. LaViolette filed a grievance with
the employer. That grievance was resolved to the satisfaction of the

employer and the union but not to Laviolette's satisfaction. LaViolette then
filed an interna1 union complaint which, once again, was not resolved to his

satisfaction. He then filed a complaint before the New Brunswick Labour
and Employment Board alleging a violation of section S(2) of the Industriai
Relahom Act. That section, one of several setting out union unfair labour

practices, provides as follows:
5(2) No trade union or council of trade unions,

and no person acting on behalf of a trade union or
council of trade unions, shall seek by intimidation,
by coercion, by the threat of dismissal or loss of
employment, by the imposition of a pecuniary or
other penalty, by undue influence or by any other
means, to compel or to induce an employee or
other person to become or to refrain from

becoming, or to cease to be, a member or officer
of a trade union or council of trade unions, or to
deprive an employee or other person of his rights
under this Act. "
The trade union objected to the jurisdiction of the Labour and Employment

Board to hear Laviolette's complaint.
The issue was fiamed by Vice Chair Kuttner in the following terms:

"Does the Labour and Employment Board have
jurisdiction to entertain a complaint under section
106(1) of the Industrial Relations Act that a trade
union which holds bargaining rights pursuant to
the Act has breached its duty of fair representation
owed to employees in the bargaining unit for
which its acts as bargaining agent?" and secondly,
"whether the terms of the Act are sufficiently
capacious to embrace the duty of fair
representation is the very matter now before us for
determination."'71
Vice Chairman Kuttner answered the questions in the positive. He dismissed
Justice McIntyre's observation in Dutcher that "the common law applies and

recourse may be had to this

by stating the court was "merely

observing that the Act lacks explicit statutory language imposing a duty of
fair representation. " 181

179

Supra, note 178 at 143,307.
Note 120 at 379.
Note 178 at 143,308.

In the absence of explicit statutory language and in the face of clear

pronouncements from the New Brunswick courts that it had jurisdiction in
matters involving alleged unfair representation, how then did Vice Chairman
Kutmer conclude he had jwisdiction? With respect, by clothing himself with
the powers of a federally appointed judge. This was accomplished by
carefully and selectively applying decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada
that failed to acknowledge administrative tribunals (particularly labour
tribunals) are part of the executive branch of govemment and thereby
treating them as if they were federaily appointed judges possessed of

inherent jurisdiction.
Consider for example the reasoning of Vice Chair Kumier:

ln

1.

firstly, he took cognizance of the fact that L'Heureux-Dubé in
Gendron had concluded that the "cornmon law and statutory
codifications [p 13191 had the sarne content." 1 have already
indicated that erroneous statement has hindered appropriate
assessrnent of the issues in the Provinces. The case of
Maldowan is the best example.

2.

secondly, he relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Royal Oak Mines h c . v. GznadcL (Labour Relations
Board)la2where the court concluded a labour tribunal could
impose a coliective agreement upon the parties as part of its
remedial power in the absence of explicit language in the
statute. And, significantly, in the face of specific language

(1996) 133 D.L.R. (4th) 129 (S.C.C.).

authorizing such a procedure for first agreements. lg3
3.

thirdly, he relies upon what he refers to as the "judicial
preference for the resolution of work place disputes before
specialized mbunals. " In doing so he cites St. Anne Nackawic
Pu@ & Paper Co,O 'Leary, and Weber.'"

4.

fourthly, he relies upon the interpretative role mbunals may
now play given the existence of the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. He States:
"Through constant exposure to a climate sufised
with constitutional values, mbunals become ever
more sensitized to them and, by a process almost
spontaneous, refine legislative values to the rigours
of that climate. In this way, constitutional noms
are breathed into legislative ones in the ordinary
process of the interpretation of enabling legislation
by tribunals such as ours. rr 185

5.

finally, he makes reference to the broad protection fmm review
afforded by Canadian Union of Public Employees and New
Brunswick Liquor Corporuti~n.'~~
He refers to this case as the
cornerstone in the "consistent trend in modem jurisprudence to
emphasize the peculiar strength of labour mbunals as the
preferred instnimentality for the resolution of work place
disputes arising within the context of labour legislation. 187
11

While concluding the Labour and Employment Board did have

'"

See, sub-sections 80(1) and 99(2) of Carta.& Labour O d e .

Supra, note 178 at 143,314.
lg5

Supra. note 178 at 143, 3 13.
(WZJ),97 D.L.R. (3d) 417 (S.C.C.).

'" Supra, note 178 at 143, 314.
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jurisdiction to hear the complaint, by separate decision rendered May 7,
1997 the complaint was dismissed.

The Laviolette matter came on for judicial review before Deschênes,
His Lurdship concluded the standard of review was one of patent
unreasonableness although he did consider, whether, given the jurisdictional
nature of the question posed, it might be appropriate to apply a correctness

standard.
Even applying the patently unreasonable standard for review the
leamed mal judge concluded the Labour and Employment Board's decision
should be removed into the superior court and quashed. The basis for his
decision included, infer dia, the following:
1.

the plain meaning of subsection 5(2) of the Industrial Relations
AC?;

2.

lgl

the fact the Legislahue had specifically provided for a duty of
fair representation toward employers of an accredited
employer's organization (S. 51(1) of the Act)lg2 and had

Unreported decision dateci May 7, 1997, N.B. Labour & Ernployment Board,
Vice Chairman Kuttner.

United Brotherhoud of Carpemers & Joiners of America. Local 1023 et al. and
Lionel Luvene, et al. (1997), 98 C.L.L.C.220414 at 143,116 (N.B.Q.B.)(T.D.).
la9

Ig1

Supra, note 189 at 143,122.

Ig2

Supra, note 189 at 143,123.

chosen not to do so for employees.
3.

the fact the Board ignorai the comments of "three different
courts to the effect that the legislature in our Province has not
codified the union duty of fair representation. " 193

Ln Laviolette, the issue of most serious import was much broader than

whether or not the cornplainant had a right of redress before the courts or

an administrative tribunal. The most serious question concerneci the
paramountcy of Parliament. That issue was brought clearly into focus by
Deschênes, J. on several occasions in the course of rendering his judgment.
He stated:
"Although 1 share the views expressed by the
Board that Labour tribunals should probably be
considered as the "preferred instnimentality"or
the resolution of such disputes, such decisions
belong to the legislature and not to the judiciary or
labour tribunals. " lg4
"In my opinion, the New Brunswick legislature
has, for whatever reason, chosen not to enact a
provision codiQing the union duty of fair
representation and to imply such a duty . . .
cannot be rationally supported by the relevant
legislation. " Ig5
Ibid. Here his Lordship refers to Dutcher, supra, note 120; Hedges v. CaMdan
Auto Works(1997), 97 C.L.L.C.220-023 (P.E.I.S.C.)(T.D.)andLecï.irv.
S.A.T.A.P..
Local 4 (1989), 103 N.B.R. (2d) 43 (Q.B.D.).
lg3

'%

Supra, note 189 at 143, 123.

Ig5

ibid.
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The Labour and Emplopent Board appealed the matter to the New
Brunswick Court of Appea1.I" The Court of AppeaI concluded the whole
issue then before it was moot. The Labour and Employment Board had
dismissed the complaint. Laviolette took no interest in the issue then before
the Court. The employer took no interest in the issue. Since the trade union
had obtained the remedy it was seeking before the Board (dismissal of the

complaint), it ~ O Oaccording
,
to the Court of Appeal, had no "lis" with any
other proper party before the Court of Appeal.
However, after concluding the issue was moot and Deschênes, J.
therefore had no jurisdiction to render the decision he did, the Court, clearly
in obiter, did indicate its agreement with the conclusions reached by
Deschênes, J., assuming the matter had been properly before him.
As was the case in St. Anne NacKawic and O'Leary, we see the New

Brunswick Court of Appeal once again showing preference toward the courts
and the Legislatue over an expanded role for statutory tribunals.

Two recent judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada show an
increased sensitivity toward the courts' own jurisdiction and the role of the
Legislator. Those decisions, Brotherhood of Mainienance and Way
Lmiolette v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of Amenca. Local 1023
Q.L. Ref: 119981 N.B.J. No. 130 (C.A.).
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Empluyees and Canadian Pacifc Lrd.lW and Bell v. Canada ( H m n
Rights ~ o m m i s s i o n may
) ~ ~ ~well signal a change in amtude by the Supreme

Court of Canada. The result may be a more cautious approach to the role
to be played by administrative mbunals in our democracy.
While this paper is not intended to be a critique of the current trends
in judicial review, this study of the evolution of the duty of fair

representation and the duty to accommodate has demonstrated to me how
quickly some administrative mbunals, with the full complicity of the
Supreme Court of Canada build upon their own decisions and those of the

Supreme Court to continually expand their influence. As that influence
expands, the Legislator becomes an ignored parmer in the governing

process.
Those concerns are much better articulated by Larner, C .J-C. in Bell.
The facts in Bell and its cornpanion case, Cooper v. Canadian Human Rights

Commissionig9concemed allegations of age discrimination. Two airline

pilots who were forced to retire at age 60 brought cornplaints of age
discrimination before the Canadiari Human Rights Commission pursuant to

'"

(1996) 136 D.L.R. (4th)289 (S.C.C.).

lg8

(1996) 140 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.C.).
(1996), 140 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.C.).
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the Canadian Hwnan Righrs

The Commission dismissed the

A ~ . ~ O O

cornplaints and refusai to appoint a mbunai. The retirernent was not
discriminatory because the pilots had reached the normal retirement age and
furthemore, if there was discrimination, it was justified under section 1 of
the Canadian Charter of Righrs and Freedoms. Applications for judicial

review were not successful. Furthemore, in the Federal Court of
A p p e p l Marceau, J. concluded neither the Commission nor a mbunal
appointed by it had the power to determine the constitutionality of its
enabling statute.

In the Supreme Court of Canada the majority judgment was written
by La Forest, J. (Sopinka, Gonthier and Iacobucci, JJ. concurring) . Lamer,

C.J-C. wrote his own judgment in which he concurred with the conclusion

reached by La Forest, J. Their Ladyships McLachlin and L'Heureux-Dubé
concurred in their dissent from the major@.
The issue facing the Supreme Court in Bell was whether the Human

Rights Commission had the power to determine the constitutionality of its
enabling statute.

R.S.C. 1985, c.H-6.
20'

(1994), 94

C.L.L.C.17,032(Fed. C.A.).
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The disquiet of the Chief Justice is evident in the opening remarks of
his judgment:
"Although my colleagues disagree on the outcome
of these appeals, bey nevertheless agree on the
governing legai proposition: that mbunals which
have jurisdiction over the general law, have
jurisdiction to refuse to apply - and have
effectively to render inoperative - laws that they
find to be unconstitutional, since through the
operation of s.52 of the Constitution Act, 1982,the
constitution is the supreme law of Canada. 1 agree
with them that this proposition emerges from
previous decisions of this Court and that it binds
us today . However, 1 hope that a full bench of this
Court will eventually be afforded the opportunity
to revisit this proposition."
His Lordship urges his brother and sister judges to senously consider
how their previous decisions in Cuddy Chi&

Ltd. v. Ontano Labour

Relations Board, Tetreault-Godoury v . Canada (Employment and
Immigraîion, and Douglas/Kw&en

Fuculty Association v. Douglas College

have, in effect, resulted in the tail wagging the dog.

In the mlogy of cases referred to by Lamer, C.J.C. the Supreme
Court of Canada had concluded that administrative tribunals, possessed of
no inherent jurisdiction, could declare laws inoperative and refuse to apply
them. While a tribunal could not declare a law invalid, the distinction
between invalidity and inoperability, is not one that would be appreciated by
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the average person on the Street or for that matter, the average person's

representative who was entrusted to enact the law.
It is that power, apparently bestowed upon tribunals by the Courts,

and not devolved by the Legislator that now troubles the Chief Justice. In
a very thoughtful anaiysis, he urges a reconsideration of the broad powers

afforded by the Courts to administrative tribunals.
He bases his argument upon two centrai themes. Firstly, given the
role of the courts to superintend the Legislator and make decisions
concerning the validity or invalidity of laws, no body other than courts of
inherent jurisdiction shouid exercise that function. 1 wholeheartedly agree.
Before the advent of the Charter, when the vast majority of constitutional
cases were decided based upon the division of powers, it would have been
highly irregular for a tribunal, being a part of the executive branch of

government, to proclaim laws inoperative because they encroached upon the
powers of another level of govemment.
The second basis upon which the Chief Justice relies in urging a

reconsideration of the powers afforded to tribmals is rooted in the concept
of Parliamenmy democracy. He States that one of the aspects of
Parliamentary democracy is the legal relationship between the executive
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branch and the legislative branch. Centrai to that relationship is that the
executive must implement policies approved and enacted by the legislature.
if the executive branch, qua, administrative tribunal, possesses the power

to render inoperative laws enacted by its Creator, where then is to be found
the principle of Parliamentary democracy? I would hesitate to use the word

Creator to describe the relationship between the legislature and an
administrative tribunal if it (the mbunal) was possessed of some, albeit
minor, inherent jurisdiction. I know of none.
The Chicf Justice is quick to point out that his approach does not in

any way limit the use of the Charter by tribunals as they seek to interpret

enactments they are to presume are constitutionally valid.
It is this expressed desire to rein in administrative tribunals that might

in the future lirnit the Supreme Court's willingness to presume ouster of its
jurisdiction where none is explicitly stated; equate its own jurisdiction in
fields of negligence with a codification of some similarity but lacking
exactitude; and finally, permit the creation by administrative tribunals of
duties such as the duty to accommodate when no statutory basis for such a
duty exists.
The second case that indicates the Courts might be more willing in the
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future to assert their distinctiveness from administrative tribunals is that of
Brotherhood of Maintetuznce and Way Employees. The employer sought to

change its employees' work schedule from 10 days on and 4 days off to 5
days on and 2 days off. The union grieved pursuant to the collective
agreement then in force. While awaiting the arbitration ruling the union
sought and obtained an interim injunction from the British Columbia
Supreme Court to prevent the employer from implementing the new work
schedule. The employer's appeals to the British Columbia Court of Appeal
and the Supreme Court of Canada failed. It is interesthg to note that al1 nine

justices of the Supreme Court of Canada sat on the appeal, and al1 nine
justices concurred. Only one judgment was rendered.
Why was leave granted? When one considers that four justices of the
British Columbia court (one trial judge and three appellate judges) were

apparently of one mind and the only cases cited of significance by the full
bench of the Supreme Court of Canada were St. Anne Nackawic, Weber and

O'Leav it is this author's view the Supreme Court wanted to qualiQ

somewhat the impressions lefi in earlier decisions that it considered itself
ousted from a consideration of labour matters unrelated to wildcat strikes.
Relying upon those same three cases the Supreme Court could have just as
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easily concluded the jurisdiction of the courts was ousted, the interim
injunction was made without jurisdiction, and it should thereby be lifted.
The GnadcL hbour Code, the legislation at issue in Brotherhood of

Maintenunce and W q Empluyees contained a clause virtually identical to
section 55 of the New Bninswick Industrial Relations Act that was
~ ~ collective
considered in St. Anne Nackawic and O ' ~ e a r y .Every

agreement was to contain a clause providing for the final settlement of
differences between the parties or employees bound by the agreement.
The contract was in Ml force.
There was a standard management rights clause that granted the

employer the right to manage its work force.
The Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged there is a general rule
in labour relations that employees "obey now, grieve later.

19

203

Relying upon its residual discretionary power to grant relief not

available under the statutory scheme the Court concluded the injunction was
a valid exercise of discretion by the lower court. With respect, nothing
under the statutory scheme prevented the employer and the union from

Un

R.S.C. 1985, C. L-2,S. 57(1).

Supra, note 197 at 294. This principle was approved by the Court in Keiso v. The
Queen. [1981] 2 S.C.R. 199; 120 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
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agreeing to dispense with the "obey now, grieve later" mie. Furthermore,
nothing prevented the employer and the union Born agreeing that an
arbitrator properly seized with a grievance could rnake appropriate interim
orders.
Given these recent judgments from the New Brunswick Court of

Appeal and the Suprerne Court of Canada it would appear that in New
Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Rince Edward Island the courts will continue,
unimpeded by labour tnbunals, to develop standards unions are expected to
meet when dealing with their members.

CHAPTER VI
Conclusion & Summary

The genesis of the duty of fair representation is a classic example of
the common law approach to the resolution of problems arising between
individuals in our society in those circumstances where the Legislator had
not specifically provided a remedy.
In a similar fashion, human rights aibunais have employed the same

common law approach to develop the duty of reasonable accommodation.
With respect, given that those tribunals were not judges possessed of
inherent jurisdiction the constitutional basis of the duty to accommodate is
suspect. No doubt Lamer, C.J.C.3 desire to revisit the role of tribunals in
interpreting the Charter would include a reevaluation of administrative law
making in general.

Without question, the current state of the law in Canada concerning
a union's responsibility toward its members is a collection of differing
statutes, interpretations of those statutes, and differing applications of

cornmon law principles .
In those Provinces where the duty of fair representation has not been
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codified, complaints about a union's conduct in the collective bargaining or
rights determination process will no doubt be subjected to a standard of

ordinary negligence. In Provinces where the duty has been codified, except
in cases where statutory language declares a different standard, tribunals will

no doubt continue to apply the gross negligence standard.
Whether or not the duty has been codified, it seems actions founded
in simple negligence survive where the union's conduct is unrelateci to the
collective bargaining process or grievance arbitration. For example, where
it undertakes to implement its own health plan and negligently allocates

While the gross negligence test might be the proper standard by which
to measure a union's conduct at the negotiating table, it is submitted a
simple negligence standard is appropriate for the determination of rights
under the collective agreement, especidly where matters of discipline and
termination are involved.
The Legislatures and Parliament, have, by their enactments, or lack

of legislative control, made policy decisions about the duty of unions toward
their membership. In those circumstances where the Legislator has chosen
not to act we have seen efforts by tribunals to N1 the perceived void. As a
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result, particularly in the case of the duty to accommodate we have seen the
courts permit mbunals to be the crafters of legislation as well as arbiters of
its impact. This author senously doubts whether the Legislator intended
mbunals to exercise such wide powers.
It is appropriate to close by posing the following question with respect

to the interplay between human rights developments and the duty of fair
representation. What role, if any, does the courts' approval of the concept
of unintentional (adverse effect) discrimination have upon the "nondiscrimination" component of the duty of fair representation? In the past that
component was only violated if the union was guiity of intentional
discrimination. The "arbitrary" component of the test caught unintentional
conduct. Has the test been dramaticaily altered by recent interpretations of
human rights legislation? That issue has yet to be addressed by the courts.

Hopefblly, the Legislator witl intervene before that becomes necessary.

APPENDIX A
LABOUR LEGISLATION
(F'ArR REPIRESENTATION)
Canada Labour Code

Canada

R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2 as amended
Sec. 37

A trade union or representative of a trade union that is the

bargaining agent for a bargaining unit shall not act in a rnanner
that is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith in the
representation of any of the employees in the unit with respect
to their rights under the collective agreement that is applicable
to them.
Newfoundland

Sec. 130

Labour Relations Act
R.S.N. 1990, c. L-1 as amended

An employee in a bargaining unit, who claims to be
aggrieved because his or her bargaining agent has failed to act
in good faith, in the handling of a grievance that he or she has
filed with that bargaining agent in accordance with a procedure
(1)

(a) that has been established by the bargaining agent;
and

(b) to which the employee has not been given ready
access,
may make a written complaint to the board.
(2) A complaint made under subsection (1) shall be made
within 90 days from the date on which the grievance first arose.

(3) The board shdl investigate a complaint made to it under
subsection (1) and detexmine whether there was a failure by the
bargaining agent to act in good fa&

(4) A provision in this Act or a collective agreement that
limits the t h e in which a grievance or arbitration proceeding
shall begin or a decision made does not apply where a matter
is referred to the board under this section.
Where, on investigation of a cornplaint in accordance
with subsection (3), the board h d s that there was a failwe to
act in good faith by the bargaining agent concerned, the board
shall direct that bargaining agent to take those steps that the
board thiab appropriate in the circumstances.
(5)

(6) Where a collective agreement expires before a compla.int
is made to the board under subsection (1), or where a collective
agreement expires before the board completes its investigation,
the board may order the bargaining agent to compensate the
employee to a reasonable extent that the board may prescribe.

Nova Scotia

Trade Union Act
R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 475 as amended

Prince Edward Island

Labour Act
R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. L-1 as amended

New Brunswick

Industrial Relations Act
R.S.N.B. 1973, C. 1-4

Ouebec

Labour Code
R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-27 as amended

Sec, 47.2

A certified association shall not act in bad faith or in an
arhitrary or discriminatory rnanner or show serious negligence
in respect of employees comprûmised in a bargaining unit
represented by it, whether or not they are rnembers.

Ontario
Sec. 74

Labour Relations Act, 1995
S. O. 1995, C. L-2
A trade union or council of trade unions, so long as it continues

to be entitled to represent employees in a bargaining unit, shall
not act in a manner that is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad
faith in the representation of any of the employees in the unit,
whether or not members of the trade union or of any
constituent union of the council of trade unions, as the case
may be.
Sec. 75

Where, pursuant to a collective agreement, a trade union is
engaged in the selection, referral, assignment, designation or
scheduling of persons to employrnent, it shall not act in a
manner that is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith.

Manitoba

The Labour Relations Act

R.S.M.1987, c. L-10 as amended
Sec. 20

Every bargaining agent which is a pamy to a collective
agreement, and every person acting on behalf of the bargaining
agent, which or who, in representing the rights of any
employee under the collective agreement,
(a)

in the case of the dismissai of the employee

(i) acts in a manner which is arbitrary, discriminatory
or in bad faith, or
(ii) fails to take reasonable care to represent the
interests of the employee; or
(b)

in any other case, acts in a manner which is arbitrary,
discriminatory or in bad faith;

commits an unfair labour ~ractice.
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Saskatchewan
Sec. 25.1

The Trade Union Act
R.S.S. 1978, c. T-17 as amended

Every employee has the right to be fairly represented in
grievance or rights arbitration proceedings under a collective
bargaining agreement by the trade union certified to represent
his bargaining unit in a manner that is not arbitrary,
discriminatory or in bad faith.
Labour Relations Code
S.A. 1988, c. L-1.2 as amended

Alberta

Sec. 151

No trade union or person acting on behaif of a trade
union shall deny an employee or former employee who is or
was in the bargaining unit the right to be fairly represented by
the trade union with respect to his nghts under the collective
agreement.
(1)

Subsection (1) does not render a trade union liable to an
employee for hancial loss to the ernployee if
(2)

(a) the made union acted in good faith in representing
the employee, or
the loss was as the result of the employee's own
conduct .
(b)

(3) When a cornplaint is made in respect of an alleged denial
of fair representation by a trade union under subsection (1), the
Board may extend the time for the taking of any step in the
grievance procedure under a collective agreement,
notwithstanding the expiration of that tirne, subject to any
conditions that the Bcrrd may prescribe, if the Board is
satisfied that

the denial of fair representation has resulted in loss
of employment or substantial amounts of work by the
employee or former employee,
(a)

(b)

there are reasonable grounds for the extension, and

(c) the empioyer will not be substantially prejudiced
by the extension, either as a result of an order that the
trade union compensate the employer for any financial
Ioss or otherwise.
Labour Relations Code
S.B.C.1992, c. 82 as amended

British Columbia

Sec. 12

A trade union or council of trade unions shall not act in
a manner that is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith
(1)

(a) in representing any of the employees in an
appropriate bargaining unit, or
(b)

in the referral of persons to empioyment

whether or not the employees or persons are rnembers of the
trade union or a constituent union of the council of trade
unions.
It is not a violation of subsection (1) for a trade union to
enter into an agreement under which
(2)

an employer is permitted to hire by name certain
trade union members,
(a)

a hiring preference is provided to trade union
members resident in a particular geographic area, or
(b)

(c) an employer is permitted to hire by name persons
to be engaged to perform supewisory duties.

(3) An ernployers' organization shall not act in a manner that
is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith in representing any
of the employers in the group appropriate for collective
bargainhg.

APPENDIX B
HUMAN RIGHTS LEGISLATION
Canada
Sec. 7

Canadian Human Rights Act
R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6as amended

It is a discriminatory practice, directly or indirectly,
to refuse to employ or continue to employ any
individual, or

(a)

in the course of employment, to differentiate
adversely in relation to an ernployee,
(b)

on a prohïbited ground of discrimination.
Sec. 9

It is a discriminatory practice for an employee
organization on a prohibited ground of discrimination
(1)

to exclude an individual from full membership in
the organization;
(a)

(b)
or

to

expel or suspend a member of the organization;

(c) tu limit, segregate, classify or otherwise act in
relation to an individuai in a way that would deprive the
individuai of employment opportunities, or limit
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
the stams of the individual, where the individual is a
member of the organization or where any of the
obligations of the organization pursuant to a collective
agreement relate to the individual.

Exception
(2) Notwithstanding subsection (l), it is not a discriminatory
practice for an employee organization to exclude, expel or
suspend an individual fiom membership in the organization
because that individual has reached the normal age of
retirement for individuals working in positions similar to the
position of that individual.

Dennition of "employee organizatiodl
(3) For the purposes of this section and sections 10 and 60,
"employee organization" includes a trade union or other
organization of employees or local thereof, the purposes of
which include the negotiation, on behalf of employees, of the
terms and conditions of employment with employers.

Newfoundland

Sec. 9

Human Riehts Code
R.S.N. 1990, C. H-14

(1) An employer, or person acting on behalf of an employer,
shall refuse to employ or to continue to employ or otherwise

discriminate against a person in regard to employment or a term
or condition of employment because of

(a) that person's race, religion, religious creed,
political opinion, colour or ethnic, national or social
origin, sex, marital status, physical disability or mental
disabiiity; or
that person's age, if that person has reached the
age of 19 years and has not reached the age of 65 years,
@)

but this subsection does not apply to the expression of a

limitation, specification or preference based on a good faith

occupational qualification.
An employer, or a person acting on behalf of an
employer shall not use, in the hiring or recruitment of persons
(2)

for employment, an employment agency that discriminates
against persons seeking employment because of their race,
religion, religious creed, political opinion, colour or ethnic,
national or social origin, sex, marital status, physical disability
or mental disability.
(3) A trade union shall not exclude a person fiom full
membership or expel or suspend or otherwise discriminate
agauist 1 of its mernbers or discriminate against a person in
regard to his or her employment by an employer, because of

(a) that person's race, religion, religious creed,
political opinion, colour or ethnie, national or social
ongin, sex, marital status, physical disability or mental
disability; or
that persons' age, if that person has attained the
age of 19 years and has not reached the age of 65 years.
(b)

Human Rights Act
R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 214

Nova Scotia

O<)

Sec. 3

"person" includes an employer, employers'
organization, employees ' organization, professional
association, business or trade association, whether acting
directly or indirectly, alone or with another, or by the
interposition of another.

Sec. 4

For the purpose of this Act, a person discriminates where the
person makes a distinction, whether intentional or not, based on
a characteristic, or perceived characteristic, referred to in
clauses (h) to (v) of subsection (1) of Section 5 that has the

effect of imposing burdens, obligations or disadvantages on an
individual or a class of individuals not imposed upon others or
which withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits and
advantages avaiiable to other individuals or classes of
individuals in society.
Sec. 5

(1)

No person shall in respect of
(a)

the provision of or access to services or facilities;

(b)

accommodation;

(c)

the purchase or sale of property;

(d)

emplom e n t ;

(e)

volunteer public service;

(f)

a publication, broadcast or advertisement;

mernbership in a professional association, business
or trade association, employers' organization or
employees' organization,
(g)

discriminate against an individual or class of individuals on
account of

(i)

race;

0)

colour;

(k)

religion;

(1)

creed;

(m) sex;

sexual orientation;
physical disability or mental disability;

an irrational fear of contracthg an illness or
disease;
ethnic, national or aboriginal origin;
farnily status;
marital status;

source of income;
political belief, affiliation or activity;
that individual's association with another individual
or class of individuals having characteristics referred to
in clauses (h) to (u).
Prince Edward Island
Sec. 8

No employee's organization shall exclude any individual from
full membership or expel or suspend any of its members on a
discriminatory basis or discriminate against any individual in
regard to his employment by an employer.
Human Rights Act
R.S.N.B. 1973, C. H-11

New Brunswick

Sec. 3

Human Rihts Act
R.S.P.E.I. 1988, C. H-12

(1) No employer, employers' organization or other person
acting on behalf of an employer shall

(a)

refuse to employ or continue to employ any

person, or
(b) discriminate against any person in respect of
employment or any term or condition of employment,

because of race, colour, religion, national origin, ancestry,
place of origin, age, physical disability, mental disability,
marital status, sexual orientation or sex.
No employment agency shall, because of race, colour,
religion, national origin, ancestry, place of origin, age, physical
disability, mental disability, marital status or sex, discriminate
against any person seeking ernployment.
(2)

(3)

No trade union or employers' organization shall
(a)

exclude any person from full membership;

expel, suspend or otherwise discriminate against
any of its members, or
(b)

discriminate against any person in respect of his
employment by an employer,
(c)

because of race, colour, religion, national origin, ancestry,
place of origin, age, physical disability, mental disability,
marital status, sexual orientation or sex.
(4)

No person shaI1

(a) use or circulate any form of application for
employment ,
(b) publish or cause to be published any advertisement
in comection with employment, or

make any oral or written inquiry in comection
with employment,
(c)

that expresses either directly or indirectly any limitation,
specification or preference, or requires an applicant to funiish
any information as to race, colour, religion, national origin,
ancestry, place of ongin, age, physicai disability, mental
disability, marital status, semai orientation or sex.
Notwithstanding subsections (l), (2), (3) and (4), a
limitation, specification or preference on the basis of race,
colour, religion, nationai origin, ancestry, place of origin, age,
physical disability, enta1 disability, marital status, sexual
orientation or sex shall be permitted if such limitation,
specification or preference is based upon a bona jide
occupational qualification as determined by the Commission.
(5)

(6) The provisions of subsections (l), (2), (3) and (4) as to
age do not apply to

(a) the tennination of employment or a refusal to
employ because of the terms or conditions of any bona
fide retirement or pension plan;
(b) the operation of the terms or conditions of any
bona fide retirement or pension plan that have the effect
of a minimum service requirement; or

(c) the operation of terms or conditions of any bona
jïde group or employee insurance plan.
(6.1) The provisions of subsections (l), (2), (3) and (4) as to
age do not apply to a limitation, specification, exclusion, denial
or preference in relation to a person who has not attained the
age of majority if the limitation, specification, exclusion, deniai
or preference is required or authorized by an Act of the
Legislanue or a regulation made under that Act.

The provisions of subsections (l), (2), (3) and (4) as to
physical disability and mental disability do not apply to
(7)

(a) the termination of employment or a refusal to
employ because of a bomjide qualification based on the
nature of the work or the circumstance of the place of
work in relation to the physical disability or mental
disability, as determineci by the Commission; or
the operation of terms or conditions of any bona
fide group or employee insurance plan.
(b)

Charter of Human Ri&& and Freedoms
R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-12, as amended
Sec. 17

No one may practice discrimination in respect of the admission,
enjoyment of benefits, suspension or expulsion of a person to,
of or from an association of employers or employees or any
professionai corporation or association of persons carrying on
the same occupation.
Human Rijzhts Code
R.S.O. 1990, c. H-19 as amended

Ontario

Sec. 17

A right of a person under this Act is not infiinged for the
reason only that the person is incapable of perfonning or
fuifilling the essential duties or requirements attending the

(1)

exercise of the right because of handicap.
The Commission, the board of inquiry or a court shall
not find a person incapable unless it is satisfied that the needs
(2)

of the person cannot be accommodated without undue hardship
on the person responsible for accommodating those needs,
considering the cost, outside sources of funding, if any, and
health and safety requirements, if any.
Sec. 24

The right under section 5 to equal treatment with respect
to ernployment is not infringed where,
(1)

(a) a religious ,philanthropie, educational, fkatemal or
social institution or organization that is primarily engaged
in serving the interests of persons identified by their
race, ancestry, place or origin, colour, ethnic origin,
creed, sex, age, marital s m s or handicap employs only
or gives preference in employment to, persons similarly
identified if the qualification is a reasonable and bona
fide qualification because of the nature of the
employrnent;
(b) the discrimination in employment is for reasons of
age, sex, record of offences or marital status if the age,
sex, record of offences or marital status of the applicant
is a reasonable and bonafide qualification because of the
nature of the employment;

an individual person refused to employ another for
reasons of any prohibited ground of discrimination in
section 5, where the primary duty of the employment is
attending to the medical or personal needs of the person
or of an il1 child or an aged, inform or ill spouse or
other relative of the person; or
(c)

an employer gants or withholds employment or
advancement in employment to a person who is the
spouse, child or parent of the employer or an employee.

(d)

Reasonable Accommodation

The Commission, the board of inquiry or a court shall
not find that a qualification under clause (l)(b) is reasonable
and bonafide uniess it is satisfied that the circumstances of the
person cannot be accomrnodated without undue hardship on the
person responsible for accommodating those circumstances
considering the cost, outside sources of funding, if any, and
health and safety requirernents, if any.
(2)

Manitoba

The Human Rights Code
C.C.S.M., C . H-175
S.M. 1987, c. 44

Sec. 12

For the purpose of interpreting and applying sections 13 to 18,
the right to discriminate where bona fide and reasonable cause
exists for the discrimination, or where the discrimination is
based upon bow fide and reasonable requirements or
qualifications, does not extend to the failure to make reasonable
accommodation within the rneaning of clause 9(l)(d).

Sec. 13

(5) No person
compensation, to

who

undermkes,

with

or

without

obtain any other person for an employment or
(a)
occupation with a third person; or
obtain an employment or occupation for any other
person; or
@)

(c) test, train or evaluate any other person for an
employment or occupation; or
(d) refer or recommend any other person for an
employment or occupation; or

(e) refer or recornmend any other person for testing,
training or evaluation for an employment or occupation;

shall discriminate when doing so, unless the discrimination is
based upon bona fide and reasonable requirements or
qualifications for the employment or occupation.
No made union, employer, employers ' organization,
occupational association, professional association or trade
association, and no member of any such union, organization or
association, shall
(6)

(a) discriminate in respect of the right to mernbership
or any other aspect of membership in the union,
organization or association; or
negotiate on behalf of any other person in respect
of, or agree on behalf of any other person to, an
agreement that discriminates;
(b)

unless bona fide
discrimination.

Saskatchewan

and reasonable cause exists for the

The Saskatchewan Human Rights Code
S.S. 1979, C. S-24.1

Sec. 17

Every person and every class of persons shall enjoy the right to
membership, and al1 the benefits appertaining to membership,
in any professiona. society or other occupationai association
without discrimination because of his or their race, creed,
religion, colour, sex, sexual orientation, famiiy status, marital
status, disability, age, nationality, ancestry, place of ongin or
receipt of public assistance.

Sec. 18

No trade union shail exclude any person fkom full membership
or expel, suspend or otherwise discriminate against any of its
members, or discriminate against any person in regard to
ernployment by any employer, because of the race, creed,
religion, colour, sex, sexual orientation, family status, marital
status, disability, age, nationality, ancestry, place of ongin or
receipt of public assistance by that person or rnember.

Alberta
Sec. 10

Individual's Ri9hts Protection Act
R.S.A. 1980, c. 1-2 as amended
No trade union, employers' organization or occupational
association shall
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(a)

exclude any person from membership in it,

(b)

expel or suspend any member of it, or

(c)

discnminate against any person or member,

because of the race, religious beliefs, colour , gender , physical
disability, mental disability, marital status, age, ancestry or
place of ongin of that person or member.
British Columbia

Sec. 9

Human Rkhts Code
S.B.C. 1984, c. 22 as arnended

No trade union, employers' organization or occupation
association shall
(a)

exclude any person from membership,

(b)

expel or suspend any member, or

(c)

discriminate against any person or member

because of the race, colour, ancestry, place of ongin, political
belief, religion, marital status, family status, physical or mental
disability, sex, sexual orientation or age of that person or
member, or because that person or member has been convicted
of a criminal or summary conviction offence that is unrelated
to the employment or intended membership.
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